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ANNUAL SURVEY OF ANTITRUST
DEVELOPMENTS 1974-75
JOHN H. SHENEFIELD*
In a year marked by double-digit inflation and sagging business
performance, antitrust was very much in the news. The President and
Congress together produced a multitude of legislative proposals.'
Major cases were filed by the government and by private plaintiffs,2
* Member of the firm of Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Virginia; A.B. (1960),
LL.B. (1965), Harvard University.
Grateful acknowledgment is made to my colleague Ray V. Hartwell, III, B.A.
(1969), J.D. (1975), Washington & Lee University, for his invaluable assistance in the
preparation of this article.
I Among the measures signed into law were the Antitrust Penalties and Proce-
dures Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974), discussed in note 5, infra, and a
measure repealing the antitrust exemptions for state fair trade laws. See BNA ANTI-
TRUST & TRADE REG. REPORT No. 743, at A-7 (1975).
Perhaps the most sweeping legislative proposal in terms of direct impact on the
statutory scheme of the antitrust laws was the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1975.
S. 1284, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). However, parens patriae amendments to the
Clayton Act, which would grant state attorneys general broad prosecutory powers,
have been introduced in several forms. S. 1284, supra, §§ 401-02 (1975); H.R. 2850,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 38, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (redesignated H.R.
8532 following substantial amendments). FTC consent decree procedures paralleling
those provided for the Justice Department under the Antitrust Procedures and Penal-
ties Act have also been proposed. H.R. 499, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
A myriad of other proposals touching on regulatory reform and other antitrust-
related substantive areas has been introduced. For a detailed critical analysis of these
developments, see Handler, Antitrust-Myth and Reality in an Inflationary Era, 50
N.Y.U.L. REv. 211 (1975).
2 In what promises to be perhaps the largest antitrust case since Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), the Justice Department has filed suit against
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., seeking to break up the giant corporation.
Numerous private suits of ambitious scope have also been instituted. For example,
several firms have charged IBM-the undisputed leader of the computer indus-
try-with a variety of antitrust violations. See, e.g., BNA ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG.
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and one or two landmark decisions emerged.' In many of the nation's
universities and throughout Washington, the belief was expressed
that the antitrust laws, properly redesigned and energetically en-
forced, could greatly assist in the restoration of a healthy and pros-
perous economy.' Partially as a result of this mood, Congress enacted
and the President signed the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act5
in November of 1974. While the effect of any of these developments
on rampant inflation is debatable, there can be little question that
the widespread belief in that effect contributed greatly to the legisla-
tion's passage; and the same credo fuels much of the debate about
the new proposals tumbling into the legislative hopper in recent con-
gressional sessions.
Although the Supreme Court is presumably remote from the
heady debates on antitrust swirling through Washington's corridors
of power, it too was active in antitrust last year. Of its seven antitrust
decisions, one, invalidating lawyers' minimum fee schedules, can
clearly be described as a landmark. One decision in the securities
area 7 may well prove to be a significant turning point in the develop-
ment of the relationship between regulation and the antitrust law,
and a second8 spells out further the conditions for legislative exemp-
REPORT No. 697, at A-10 (1975). Moreover, the Goldfarb decision appears to have
sparked litigation involving professional restrictions on price competition, advertising,
and the like. See, e.g., BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REPORT No. 720, at A-7 et seq.
(1975).
3 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); United States v. National
Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
See Handler, Antitrust-Myth and Reality in an Inflationary Era, 50 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 211 (1975).
Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974); 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2, 3, 16, 28 and 29
(Supp. Feb. 1975). That Act raises the maximum fine permissible for Sherman Act
violations for individuals from $50,000 to $100,000, and for corporations from $50,000
to $1,000,000. Violation of the Sherman Act is raised from a misdemeanor to a felony,
and the maximum jail term is increased from one to three years. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (Supp.
Feb. 1975). In addition the new Act amends the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 28-29
(Supp. Feb. 1975), to permit greater utilization of the Circuit Courts of Appeals and,
finally, the Act subjects the consent decree process to greater public scrutiny. 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 16(b)-(h) (Supp. Feb. 1975). For example, when filing a proposed consent
decree with a court the United States is required simultaneously to file a "competitive
impact statement" explaining the proposal and its consequences. The court must
consider the impact statement and other evidence bearing on the efficacy of the pro-
posed decree, and cannot enter a consent judgment until it has determined that such
entry is in the public interest.
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
United States v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
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tion from the antitrust laws. A bank merger case9 continued a trend
of defeats for the government's challenges of mergers under §7 of the
Clayton Act.'" Finally, the* Court found time to deal, in two cases,"
with the interstate commerce requirements of the Clayton and
Robinson-Patman Acts.'
2
In general, these decisions continued the move away from anti-
trust activism and reflected the shift in the Court's idealogical bal-
ance of power. With the exception of the minimum fee case'" and
United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., '4 each of the Court's
antitrust decisions reflected a more modest view of the scope of the
antitrust laws. In fact, the government lost three of the four cases in
which it was involved as a party.'"
With the exception of ITT Continental, the Court's "new anti-
trust majority," described by Mr. Justice White in his dissent last
spring in United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc.,6 was on the
United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
W See United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974); United
States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). These decisions and the trend signaled by them
are discussed in Shenefield, Annual Survey of Antitrust Developments-Class Actions,
Mergers, and Market Definition: A New Trend Toward Neutrality, 32 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 299, 321-45 (1975) [hereinafter Shenefield, A New Trend Toward Neutrality].
11 United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975); Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 491 U.S. 186 (1974).
12 American Building Maintenance dealt with the "engaged in commerce" re-
quirement of § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18. Copp Paving concerned the similar
jurisdictional requirements of § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970), and of §§ 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§9 14 and 18 (1970).
The seventh case, United States v. IIT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223
(1975), was a 5-4 decision that an acquisition in violation of a Federal Trade Commis-
sion consent order could be considered a "continuing failure or neglect to obey" within
the meaning of the civil penalty provisions of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21(1) (1970)
and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (1970) and thus subject to
daily penalties under those statutes.
13 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
2 420 U.S. 223 (1975).
" The cases lost by the government were United States v. National Ass'n of
Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975); United States v. American Building
Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975); and, United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l
Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975). The fourth case, which the government won, was United
States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223 (1975).
" United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 642 (1974) (White,
J., dissenting). See Shenefield, A New Trend Toward Neutrality, supra note 10, at 338-
39. The new antitrust majority referred to by Mr. Justice White consists of Burger,
C.J., and Stewart, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist, JJ. All of these justices are
1976]
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prevailing side in every case. In four of the five cases in which there
were dissents, Justices Douglas and Brennan were numbered among
the dissenters. 7 In the Term's two 5-4 decisions, it was the vote of
Mr. Justice Blackmun that produced victory, in United States v.
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. for the defendants,
and in ITT Continental for the plaintiffs.
What was only barely discernible in the 1973-74 Term of the Su-
preme Court 8 must now be recognized as an unmistakable fact. The
Court is headed in the direction of a more modest interpretation of
the antitrust laws. Neutrality in the application of these statutes-a
distant goal only two terms ago-once again characterizes the Su-
preme Court's antitrust decisions.
II.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND THE CLAYTON ACT
This past Term's antitrust work began quietly enough with a deci-
sion" addressing the interestate commerce standards under the Clay-
ton"0 and Robinson-Patman' Acts. By a 7-2 margin,2 the Supreme
appointees of Republican Presidents, and all except Justice Stewart, appointees of
President Nixon.
In spite of Mr. Justice White's critical remarks last Term, it should be noted in
fairness that he voted with the prevailing view in five out of the seven antitrust cases
decided by the Court this Term.
'" In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974), Mr. Justice Douglas
filed a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice Brennan joined. Id. at 204. Mr. Justice
Douglas again spoke for the two dissenters in United States v. American Bldg. Mainte-
nance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 286 (1975). Mr. Justice Blackmun filed a separate dissent-
ing opinion in American Building Maintenance. Id. at 287. In United States v. Citizens
& S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 130 (1975), Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion
was joined by Douglas and White, JJ. Justices Douglas and Brennan cast their final
dissenting antitrust votes of the year when, along with Mr. Justice Marshall, they
joined Mr. Justice White's dissent in United States v. National Ass'n of Securities
Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 735 (1975).
The fifth case in which dissents were filed was the United States' only victory
during the term. Not surprisingly, the dissenters in ITT Continental were all members
of the Court's "new antitrust majority." United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,
420 U.S. 223, 243 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Powell
and Rehnquist, JJ.).
" See Shenefield, A New Trend Toward Neutrality, supra note 10.
" Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974).
2 Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730. Sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act
contain the relevant interstate commerce requirements. Section 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14
(1970), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods,
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Court restated the traditional view requiring a greater involvement
in interstate commerce for Robinson-Patman or Clayton Act cases
than has been the rule for Sherman Act analysis.?
wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities...
on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or pur-
chaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competi-
tors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale or con-
tract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be
to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce.
Id.
In pertinent part, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18, states:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indi-
rectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital ...
of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line
of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisi-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly. . ...
Id.
21 Act of June 19, 1936, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526. Section 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
(1970):
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and
quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrim-
ination are in commerce . . . where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monop-
oly in any line of commerce ...
Id.
Powell, J., wrote the majority opinion, in which Burger, C.J., and Stewart,
White, Marshall, Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. bougas, J., dissented, joined
by Brennan, J.
" The Sherman Act, §§ 1 and 2 prohibits the restraint and monopolization of
"trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations .. "15 U.S.C.
§§ 1 and 2 (1970), formerly ch. 647, §§ 1 and 2, 26 Stat. 209. The jurisdictional reach
of the Sherman Act, unlike that of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts, has been
interpreted as coextensive with the constitutional power of the Congress to regulate
commerce. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219, 229-35 (1948) ("affecting commerce" standard of Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111
(1942), incorporated into the Sherman Act); United States v. South-Eastern Underwri-
ters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944) ("That Congress wanted to go to the utmost extent
of its Constitutional power in restraining trust and monopoly agreements. . . admits
of little, if any doubt.") Id. Thus, the decisions have clearly established that "an
activity which does not itself occur in interstate commerce comes within the scope of
the Sherman Act if it substantially affects interstate commerce." Burke v. Ford, 389
U.S. 320, 321 (1967) (per curiam). Accord, e.g., United States v. Employing Plasterers
Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 189 (1954) ("wholly local business restraints" can produce the
effects condemned by the Sherman Act); United States v. Woman's Sportswear Mfrs.
1976]
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When the Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, Congress set out to
strengthen the antitrust laws. A quarter of a century of Sherman Act
enforcement had by then clearly revealed significant gaps in the legis-
lative drive against anticompetitive practices. Moreover, a laissez-
faire view of economics held by the federal judiciary and a reluctance
to apply criminal penalties to those many deemed to be successful
businessmen stalled enforcement and led to highly restrictive deci-
sions in the courts. Following the presidential election of 1912, in
which the platforms of the three major political parties called for an
all-out legislative effort to enhance antitrust enforcement, Congress
convened in a bipartisan mood to clarify and extend the reach of the
antitrust laws. One result was the Clayton Act. 4
To expand the scope of the antitrust laws, Congress made the
substantive provisions of the Clayton Act more explicit than those
contained in the Sherman Act, thus reducing the room for judicial
discretion. 5 In addition, the burden of proving the proscribed anti-
competitive effect necessary for liability was substantially reduced. 6
Paradoxically, however, the more precise language of the Clayton Act
creates a number of procedural and jurisdictional requirements that
seem to restrict the applicability of its broader substantive provi-
sions. Chief among these is the language of the various provisions of
the Act that requires a close connection between the conduct chal-
lenged and the flow of interstate commerce. In §3 of the Act, for
instance, the relevant language requires that the prohibited conduct
must be engaged in by a person "in commerce, in the course of such
commerce. .. ."I' Similarly, the antimerger provisions of § 7 apply
Ass'n., 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949) ("If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it
does not matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze."Id.); Uniform Oil
Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 400 F.2d 267, 269 (9th Cir. 1968) (where activities are
wholly intrastate, plaintiff is required to prove that they had a "not insubstantial"
effect upon interstate commerce).
24 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970). Congress also enacted the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970), in 1914.
2 Rather than general prohibitions of the sort found in the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970), the Clayton Act forbids exclusive dealing, acquisitions, and
interlocking directorates that have certain proscribed effects on competition. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 14, 18 and 19 (1970).
21 In §§ 3 (exclusive dealing and tying arrangements) and 7 (acquisitions) of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14 and 18, for instance, the language of the statute requires
proof only of practices that "may" substantially lessen competition. In contrast to the
language of the Sherman Act condemning unreasonable restraints of trade, the Clay-
ton Act language has been construed to prohibit practices that are only reasonably
probable, although not certain, to injure competition. Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
2 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
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to corporations "engaged in commerce.""8 Like provisions exist in §
89 and § 101o of the Act. Indeed, the original § 2 of the Clayton Act,
now substantially amended by the Robinson-Patman Act,3' also ap-
plied only to persons "engaged in commerce."3
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
- 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1970). In pertinent part, § 8 provides:
No person at the same time shall be a director in any two or more
corporations. . . engaged in whole or in part in commerce. . . if such
corporations are or have been competitors, so that the elimination of
competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation
of any of the provisions of any of the antitrust laws.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 20 (1970). In pertinent part, § 10 provides:
No common carrier engaged in commerce shall have any dealings...
with another. . . firm. . . when the said common carrier shall have
upon its board of directors . . any person who is at the same time a
director . . . of. . . such other . . . firm ...
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 13-13B (1970).
38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970). The original § 2 provided:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly to discriminate
in price between different purchasers of commodities, which commod-
ities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States
or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular
possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States,
where the effect of such discrimination may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of Commerce:
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent discrimination
in price between purchasers of commodities on account of differences
in the grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity sold, or that makes
only due allowance for difference in the cost of selling or transporta-
tion, or discrimination in price in the same or different communities
made in good faith to meet competition: And provided further, That
nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling
goods, wares, or merchandise in commerce from selecting their own
customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade.
Id.
The section was interpreted as allowing quantity discounts without regard to
whether the buyer was a wholesaler or retailer. Mennen Co. v. F.T.C., 288 F. 774 (2d
Cir. 1923). With the advent of large chain stores and mail-order houses this interpreta-
tion came to render the section largely ineffective. Large scale buyers such as A&P were
able consistently to sell at lower prices than their local competitors. Unable to match
the efficiency of the chains in the marketplace, the small merchants formed alliances
with their wholesalers and distributors to lobby for legislative action designed to neu-
tralize the advantages enjoyed by the chains. This campaign resulted in the enactment
of the Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibited all price differentials other than those
based on the seller's cost savings or the distributional activities of the buyer. H. BLAKE
& R. PITOFSKY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST LAW 1053-56 (1967).
1976]
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The Robinson-Patman Act, enacted in 1936 as an amendment to
§ 2 of the Clayton Act, contains an even more specific and more
intricate set of requirements covering requisite effect on interstate
commerce. Indeed, three separate elements must be proved as part
of any price discrimination case under § 2(a) of the Act.13 In effect,
(a) the seller must be engaged in interstate commerce, (b) the chal-
lenged discrimination must be committed in the course of the seller's
interstate commerce business, and (c) at least one of the challenged
discriminatory sales transactions must occur in interstate com-
merce.
34
These more explicit requirements of the Clayton and Robinson-
Patman Acts have been thought to narrow the scope of those Acts.
Whereas, under the Sherman Act, transactions that are either in
interstate commerce or that substantially affect interstate commerce
may be covered, 31 Congress, by requiring in the Clayton and
Robinson-Patman Acts that challenged conduct occur "in" com-
merce and that the actors be themselves "engaged in commerce," was
apparently rejecting the broader "effect on commerce" test judicially
engrafted on the Sherman Act. Generally, the cases have so held.3 6
From time to time, arguments have been made that, though the
language of the statutes is different, uniformity and simplicity re-
quire that their interstate commerce requirements should be re-
garded as the same. The argument frequently takes as its premise the
notion thatCongress sought to exercise all of the constitutional au-
thority at its command.3 7 In other instances, it is based on interpreta-
1 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
' Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970), reads in
pertinent part as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, . . . where either or any of the purchases involved
in such discrimination are in commerce ...
Id.
, See note 23 supra.
See, e.g., Mayer Paving & Asphalt Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 486 F.2d
763 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 456
F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd en banc, 483 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1116 (1973); Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969);
Abramson v. Colonial Oil Co., 390 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1973); Food Basket, Inc. v.
Albertson's, Inc., 383 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1967); Willard Dairy Corp. v. National Dairy
Prods. Corp., 309 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 934 (1963). See also
E. KINTER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER 80-81 (1970); 16 C J. voNKALINOWSKI, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 26.02 (1971); Rowe, Discriminatory Sales of Commodities in Com-
merce: Jurisdictional Criteria Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 67 YALE L. J. 1155,
1168 (1958).
" The "affecting commerce" standard appears to have been read into § 2(a) by
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tions of similarly worded requirements in similar statutes in non-
antitrust areas.3 8 Arguments of this kind were addressed and laid to
rest by the Supreme Court, first in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving
Co.39 and then in United States v. American Building Maintenance
Industries" this past Term.
In the first of these cases, plaintiffs were operators of a plant
manufacturing asphaltic concrete in California." Copp sued certain
oil companies that produced liquid petroleum asphalt and their sub-
sidiaries that also manufacture asphaltic concrete. The complaint,
seeking injunctive relief and treble damages, alleged a variety of anti-
trust violations including anticompetitive price discrimination in vio-
lation of § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, anticompetitive acquisi-
tions in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act, and violations of the
exclusive dealing provisions of the Clayton Act.42
The complaint covered claims related both to the manufacture of
asphalt oil and asphaltic concrete. Because of the physical character-
istics of asphaltic concrete and the limited distance it can be trans-
ported from the plant, the defendants sought summary judgment in
their favor with respect to all violations arising from conduct in the
asphaltic concrete market. Following discovery, it was determined
that the court's jurisdiction of these claims depended on the fact that
some of the streets in the Los Angeles area were segments of the
federal interstate highway system, and on a stipulation that the
amount of asphaltic concrete used in their construction and repair
was greater than a minimal amount. As a result, the court dismissed
all claims against the defendants involving the market for asphaltic
concrete. 3
some courts. See, e.g., Shaw's, Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1939).
For a list of cases from which such an argument might be constructed see Comment,
Antitrust-The Jurisdictional Requirements of Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a) Clarified:
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 939, 941 n. 11 (1975).
For example, the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1970),
contains an "in commerce" jurisdictional requirement that has been judicially con-
strued as an "affecting commerce" standard. E.g., Alstate Constr. Co. v. Durkin, 345
U.S. 13 (1953); Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125 (1943).
419 U.S. 186 (1974).
40 422 U.S. 271 (1975).
' 419 U.S. at 189. Asphaltic concrete, used to surface roads and highways, is
manufactured at plants by combining liquid petroleum asphalt and filler aggregates
at very high temperatures. The material must be hot when put in place at the construc-
tion site and is very heavy and of low value. Consequently, asphaltic concrete can be
sold and delivered only within a 35-mile range from the producing plant. Id. at 188.
42 Id. at 190-91.
43 1972 Trade Cas. 74,013 (N.D. Cal. 1972). The summary judgment motion also
sought to eliminate the claims relating to asphalt oil, but the district court refused to
remove those issues from the case because of the interstate character of that market.
Consequently that ruling was not before the Supreme Court.
1976]
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On appeal,44 the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that production
of asphalt for use in interstate highways made the producers "instru-
mentalities" of interestate commerce and thus placed them "in" that
commerce as a matter of law.45 Likewise, viewing the Clayton Act and
Robinson-Patman Acts as intended to supplement the purpose and
effect of the Sherman Act, the Ninth Circuit held that jurisdiction
properly attached to those claims as well.4" The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, but limited its consideration to the questions aris-
ing under the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts.
47
Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, read the "in com-
merce" language of the provisions of the Clayton Act narrowly. In
contrast to the extensive reach of the Sherman Act, the more restric-
tive language of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Act provisions
requires transactions "within the flow of interstate commerce-the
practical, economic continuity in the generation of goods and services
for interstate markets and their transport and distribution to the
consumer.""
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit that Copp,
by introducing evidence of the use of the asphaltic concrete in the
construction of interstate highways, had made the necessary "in com-
merce" showing. Mr. Justice Powell did not find persuasive the rea-
soning by analogy from the cases decided under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act." While those cases held that interstate highways are in-
strumentalities of interstate commerce and therefore that employees
engaged in the construction of such roads are employees "in com-
merce,"5 the question presented by Copp arose under significantly
different statutory schemes. Undoubtedly, under the Commerce
Clause, Congress could regulate ostensibly local activities if inter-
state commerce were sufficiently involved, but the question that
arose under the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts was how far
Congress intended to reach.5' Thus while Congress had deemed inter-
" The appeal was interlocutory in nature under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970). In re
Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 202, 204 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974).
Id. at 205-06.
Id. at 206.
47 415 U.S. 988 (1974).
4' 419 U.S. at 195.
4' Id. at 196-99.
5' Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125 (1943). See also Alstate Constr.
Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13 (1953).
" 419 U.S. at 197. Mr. Justice Powell points out that the jurisdictional inquiry
under the antitrust laws, because it involves a factual determination in each case, is
quite different from the inquiry under statutes in which Congress itself has defined
specific persons and activities as affecting commerce. Id. at 197 n. 12. Compare United
ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS
state highways subject to regulation in certain aspects, there was
nothing in any relevant statutory scheme nor in the antitrust laws
themselves expressing Congress' intention to apply the full weight of
the antitrust laws to persons who supply materials to be used in the
construction of such highways. 5
The Court concluded that, in the first place, even assuming that
the language of the Act meant something more than the relatively
narrow "flow-of-commerce" concept, the kind of "nexus" approach
advanced by Copp would be an irrational way to proceed. If there
were a justification for such an expansive interpretation, it would
depend upon a congressional intention to reach even the most local-
ized of practices that result in harm to the national marketplace. The
Court, however, reasoned that such a justification would require judi-
cial determination of practical consequences, and not simply the
statement of formal or nominal relationships. The Court concluded,
therefore, that sales to interstate highway contractors were not sales
"in commerce" as a matter of law within § 2(a) of the Robinson-
Patman Act and § § 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act.53
At this stage, the Court had decided enough to reverse the Ninth
Circuit's judgment. Copp, however, offered a second theory to sup-
port the judgment arguing that Congress used the "in commerce"
language to reach as far as possible under the commerce power. Copp
argued that there should therefore be no difference between the Sher-
man Act and the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts. The Supreme
Court found on the record before it that such contentions were
equally unavailing to the plaintiffs. 4
With respect to § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, the majority
opinion alluded to the original language contained in the Patman bill
passed by the House:
[I]t shall also be unlawful for any person, whether in com-
merce or not, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in
price between different purchasers . . . where . . . such dis-
crimination may substantially lessen competition. .... 1
The Conference Committee deleted the words "whether in commerce
or not," leaving only the "in commerce" language presently in §
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 232-33 (1947), with, e.g. Maryland v. Wirtz,
392 U.S. 183 (1968); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); and Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
52 419 U.S. at 198-99.
Id. at 199.
5 Id.
Id. at 199-200, quoting H.R. 8442, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) (emphasis added).
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2(a).'1 Whatever the reason for this deletion, it suggests strongly that
Congress did not intend to duplicate the reach of the Sherman Act. 7
Moreover, as Mr. Justice Powell pointed out, the 60 years since the
enactment of the Clayton Act provisions yield hardly a single case in
which a court of appeals has read the statutory language more
broadly," yet Congress had remained silent. Taking the longstanding
interpretation, the continued congressional silence and the legislative
history into account, the Court did not feel warranted in extending §
2(a) to cover purely local activities.
Sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act were less clear, the majority
opinion admitted. Given the legislative history supporting the notion
that these provisions were enacted to complement the Sherman Act,
it would seem logical to interpret the strict jurisdictional require-
ments loosely. Such a conclusion might take greater force from the
observation that when the Clayton Act was written, the "in com-
merce" language was thought to extend to the full reach of the com-
merce clause as that reach was then understood. It can certainly be
argued that the particular words are anomalous in view of those back-
ground facts and should not be used to limit the reach of the Clayton
Act.
Mr. Justice Powell admitted that the argument had some force; 8
but he declined to follow the argument to its conclusion, and decided
in any event that the facts presented no evidence of effect on inter-
state commerce. Without a basis for considering the conclusion of the
district court to be clearly erroneous, Mr. Justice Powell concluded
that the "effects of commerce" theory, "even if legally correct,"60
419 U.S. at 200, quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
5' The opinion suggests that the motive for the deletion may have been either a
desire to reach only price discrimination in interstate markets or a purpose to adhere
to the limits of its commerce power reach as Congress then understood them. 419 U.S.
at 200. See Comment, Antitrust-The Jurisdictional Requirements of Robinson-
Patman Act § 2(a) Clarified: Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 32 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 939, 948 n.41 (1975).
- The opinion goes to some lengths to point out that Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread
Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954), a case that Copp relied upon to dispute the argument that
only a sale moving across state lines can satisfy the Robinson-Patman Act, actually
involved interstate sales and that the price discrimination condemned in that case fell
within the literal language of the statute. Despite the Court's ready explanation of
Moore, the opinion had unquestionably generated confusion in the lower courts.
Compare Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 456 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd en banc, 483
F.2d 1140 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973), with, e.g., Littlejohn, supra,
483 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1973), and Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972).




The question concerning the exact meaning of the "in commerce"
language of the Clayton Act, left somewhat ambiguous by the state-
ment in Copp that, even if appropriate, the broad statement was not
satisfied in that case, was resolved later in the Term in United States
v. American Building Maintenance Industries."2 American Building
is an enormous supplier of janitorial services, possessing some 50
branches that serve more than 500 communities in North America.
American Building acquired two smaller janitorial service companies
in Southern California. While the acquiring company was actively
engaged in interstate commerce, the district court concluded that the
acquired companies, performing their services entirely within Califor-
nia and having only insignificant contacts with interstate commerce,
were not "engaged in commerce" within the meaning of § 7 of the
Clayton Act.63 Accordingly, the Court held that there had been no
violation of that provision of the antitrust laws. 4 The government
appealed, raising the issue whether the phrase "engaged in com-
merce" as used in § 7 of the Clayton Act reaches corporations engaged
only in intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate com-
merce, and if so, whether the acquired companies' activities in this
case were sufficient to satisify that standard."5
1 The dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas meets the majority head on. The
dissenters see no evidence whatever that the word "commerce" under the Clayton Act
means something less than it meant under the Sherman Act. As to the lack of proof,
even under this broader standard, Mr. Justice Douglas thinks it improper to impose
any such burden upon plaintiffs in an antitrust case at a preliminary stage before trial.
To have concluded that there was no substantial impact on interstate commerce was,
in the language of the dissent, to require the plaintiffs to prove ". . . on a motion that
goes to the jurisdiction of the court, the merits of their case in order to obtain an
opportunity to try it." Id. at 213 (footnote omitted). Moreover, the dissenting opinion
takes the position that jurisdiction may be sustained, even on an "in commerce"
theory. Id. at 308, et seq. Agreeing with Copp as to the relevance of cases arising under
the Fair Labor Standards Act, Justice Douglas concludes that the jurisdictional reach
of the antitrust laws is substantially similar to the reach under other regulatory stat-
utes. Accordingly, the phrases "engaged in commerce" and the like should be read
similarly. 419 U.S. at 410, et seq.
12 422 U.S. 271 (1975).
" Id. at 273-75. Section 7 of the Clayton Act reads in pertinent part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital
... or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in
commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the coun-
try, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen com-
petition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970) (emphasis added).
11 422 U.S. at 275. The findings and conclusions of the district court are unre-
ported.
11 Id. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. 419 U.S. 1104 (1975).
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Once again,6" therefore, the Supreme Court was forced to look
closely at the "in commerce" language of the Clayton Act. Mr. Jus-
tice Stewart, writing for a majority of six, analyzed the government's
arguments on the basis of prior Supreme Court. decisions, and the
legislative history and the express words of the statutes themselves.
Copp Paving had certainly indicated, if it had not clearly announced,
the position of at least seven justices of the Court on that issue. More
direct prior precedent was to be found in Federal Trade Commission
v. Bunte Brothers, Inc.,7 in which the Court had squarely held that
the § 5 jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission"5 was limited
by the terms "in commerce," which did not reach local activities
''affecting commerce."
The construction of § 5 urged by the Commission would thus
give a federal agency pervasive control over myriads of local
businesses and matters heretofore traditional enough to local
law. . . . An inroad upon local conditions and local standards
of such far-reaching import as is involved here, ought to await
a clearer mandate from Congress."
The Bunte Brothers interpretation was persuasive to the Court
because both § 5 and § 7 were enacted by the same Congress and both
were designed to deal with related aspects of the same problem.
7
1
The government's arguments that the Clayton Act should be ex-
pansively interpreted in view of its express purpose to make antitrust
enforcement more effective were equally unpersuasive. While conced-
ing that it may have been anomalous to strengthen the antitrust laws
through an Act that has limited jurisdictional scope, Mr. Justice
Stewart nevertheless insisted that the "anomaly" could not be ig-
nored. Moreover, in the majority's view, even if Congress understood
its actions as implementing in the Clayton Act the full extent of its
Commerce Clause power, it used language that did not accomplish
" The decision in Copp Paving was announced December 17, 1974. While the
government's jurisdictional statement in American Building was submitted in May
1974, its main brief on the merits was not submitted until February 1975.
:7 312 U.S. 349 (1941).
1 Section 5 of the FTC Act states in pertinent part: "Unfair methods of competi-
tion in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared
unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970).
" 312 U.S. at 354-55. Congress recently provided that "clearer mandate" by
amending the Federal Trade Commission Act to replace the phrase "in commerce"
with "in or affecting commerce." Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commis-
sion Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 201, 88 Stat. 2193, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp.
Feb. 1975). The amendments were expressly designed to expand the Commission's
jurisdiction beyond the limits imposed by Bunte Brothers.
11 422 U.S. at 277.
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that purpose. Congress has in the meantime enacted statutes that
show a recognition of the distinction between legislation regulating
activities "in commerce," and legislation asserting the full Commerce
Clause power.7' In short, as the majority saw it, neither the legislative
history nor the remedial purpose of § 7 of the Clayton Act supported
an expansion of the jurisdictional scope of the statute beyond that
indicated by its express language. If Copp Paving had not closed the
door, Mr. Justice Stewart's pronouncement that the phrase "engaged
in commerce" as used in § 7 of the Clayton Act "means engaged in
the flow of interstate commerce," 7 certainly did.
The government's alternative argument that the acquired compa-
nies' activities satisfied even the narrower test was rejected by the
majority.73 Because the Benton companies neither produced, distrib-
uted nor acquired goods or services in interstate commerce,74 and
were in fact completely insulated from any direct participation in the
interstate flow of goods or services, it could not be said that the
acquired companies were themselves "engaged in commerce" within
the meaning of § 7. Where the Benton companies did utilize materials
from out of state, they purchased them from suppliers located in the
same state where the flow of commerce had ceased.75
7, E.g., National Labor Relations Act § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970). By
contrast, when it amended and reenacted § 7 of the Clayton Act in 1950, the narrow
"in commerce" formulation was retained.
72 422 U.S. at 283.
73 Id. at 283-85.
7, See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974).
11 422 U.S. at 285. Mr. Justice White concurred in the portions of the opinion
concerning the scope of § 7 of the Clayton Act, but did not join in the reasoning of the
majority supporting its judgment that the acquired companies were not in commerce.
For Mr. Justice White, it was not necessarily logical to assume that companies that
bought supplies from a local distributor, who had purchased them originally from out-
of-state manufacturers, were necessarily insulated from interstate commerce. But the
issue had not been raised by the government in that form at any level in the case. Id.
at 286. (White, J., concurring). There were two dissenting opinions. The first, by Mr.
Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan, reiterated the dissent in Copp Paving.
Id. at 286-87. Douglas and Brennan continued to disagree with the contention that the
language of § 7 was intended to give that statute a narrower jurisdictional scope than
the standard that has been read into the Sherman Act. Mr. Justice Blackmun, also
dissenting, relied on the remedial purpose of § 7 of the Clayton Act instead. Id. at 287-
88 (Mr. Justice Blackmun had sided with the majority in Copp Paving.) Assuming that
the Clayton Act was designed to supplement the Sherman Act, and to "arrest in its
incipiency" any restraint or substantial lessening of'competition, United States v. E.
I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957), it was illogical to assign to
Congress any purpose to limit the application of the Clayton Act. Accordingly, Mr.
Justice Blackmun would apply the Clayton Act not only to corporations engaged in
interstate commerce but also to those intrastate activities "substantially affecting
interstate commerce." 422 U.S. at 288.
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Together, Copp Paving and American Building Maintenance put
the Supreme Court's seal of approval on a rather consistent interpre-
tation of the "in commerce" language of the Clayton and Robinson-
Patman Acts. Admittedly, the number of cases construing the
Robinson-Patman Act language was substantial, whereas very few
had treated the issue under the Clayton Act standard.76 Now that the
" Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1953), al-
though it involved a situation in which both the acquired and acquiring corporations
were "engaged in interstate commerce" and therefore necessarily within the reach of
§ 7 of the Clayton Act, did address the issue. By contrast, the following circuit and
district court cases had construed the "in commerce" provision of § 2(a) prior to Copp
Paving and since Mead's Fine Bread Co. Scranton Constr. Co. v. Litton Indus. Leas-
ing Corp., 494 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975); Mayer
Paving & Asphalt Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 486 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1972),
rev'd en banc, 483 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973); Belliston v.
Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972); Cliff Food
Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc. 417 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969); Abramson v. Colonial Oil Co.,
390 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 831 (1968); Food Basket, Inc. v. Albert-
son's, Inc., 383 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1967); Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965); Fort Lauderdale v. East Coast Asphalt
Corp., 329 F.2d 871 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 900 (1964); United States v. South
Fla. Asphalt Co., 329 F.2d 860 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964); Shreveport
Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 971
(1964); Willard Dairy Corp. v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 309 F.2d 943 (6th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 934 (1963) (Black, J., dissenting); Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co.,
v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S.
843 (1960); Central Ice Cream Co. v. Golden Rod Ice Cream Co., 257 F.2d 417 (7th
Cir. 1958); Miles v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Wis. 1973); In re
Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 350 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd, 487 F.2d
191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); Ford Wholesale Co. v. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp., 344 F. Supp. 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1972), afl'd, 493 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974); Webster v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 338 F. Supp. 248
(S.D. Ala. 1971); Rosemound Sand & Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand & Gravel Co., 330
F. Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd, 469 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1972); Flotken's West, Inc.
v. National Food Stores, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Mo. 1970); Liquilux Gas Servs.
v. Tropical Gas Co., 303 F. Supp. 414 (D.P.R. 1969); Clausen & Sons, Inc. v. Theo.
Hamm Brewing Co., 284 F. Supp. 148 (D. Minn. 1967), rev'd, 395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir.
1968); Baldwin Hills Bldg. Material Co. v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 283 F.
Supp. 202 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Industrial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp.,
278 F. Supp. 938 (C.D. Cal. 1967), rev'd, 437 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1970); Ingram v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 259 F. Supp. 176 (D.N.M. 1966); Becker v. Safelite Glass
Corp., 244 F. Supp. 625 (D. Kan. 1965); Cream Crest-Blanding Dairies, Inc. v. Na-
tional Dairy Prods. Corp., 243 F. Supp. 331 (W.D. Mich. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 370
F.2d 332 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 930 (1967); Gaylord Shops, Inc. v. Pittsburgh
Miracle Mile Town & Country Shopping Center, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Pa.
1963); Davidson v. Kansas City Star Co., 202 F. Supp. 613 (W.D. Mo. 1962), rev'd sub
nom; Bales v. Kansas City Star Co., 336 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1964); Baim & Blank, Inc.
v. Philco Corp., 148 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
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Supreme Court has spoken, however, the only remedy for those who
wish to extend the Clayton Act and the Robinson-Patman Act to
embrace local conduct that affects interstate commerce is the legisla-
tive process. 7
It is important to realize that the Court had at hand sufficient
material that, in another day, might have produced different results.
Consider, for instance, the statements concerning § 2(a) in Moore v.
Mead's Fine Bread Co.:
We have here an interstate industry increasing its domain
through outlawed competitive practices. The victim, to be
sure, is only a local merchant; and no interstate transactions
are used to destroy him. But the beneficiary is an interstate
business; the treasury used to finance the warfare is drawn
from interstate, as well as local sources. . . . If this method of
competition were approved. . . . [t]he profits made in inter-
state activities would underwrite the losses of local price-
cutting campaigns. No instrumentality of interstate commerce
would be used. . . . [b]ut the opportunities afforded by in-
terstate commerce would be employed to injure local trade.
Congress, as guardian of the Commerce Clause, certainly has
power to say that those advantages shall not attach to the
privilege of doing an interstate business.7 8
If the language of Moore is taken at face value, it can be argued
that the Court had as early as 1954 construed the Robinson-Patman
Act to apply to wholly local transactions financed, even indirectly, by
the treasury of a corporation operating interstate. But while the
Court may have considered this possibility in Moore there existed
interstate sales, even though they happened to be not the lower, but
the higher of the prices compared under the Robinson-Patman Act.
This fact made the discussion of interstate financing almost wholly
dictum.
71 Legislative measures designed to overrule Copp Paving and American Building
Maintenance have already been introduced, See, e.g., S. 1284, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
(1975), which contained the following provision:
Sec. 701. Sections 2, 2a, 3, and 7 of the Act entitled "An Act to supple-
ment existing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies, and
for other purposes," approved October 15, 1914, (15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a,
14 and 18), are amended by striking out the words "in commerce"
wherever the term appears and inserting in lieu thereof the words "in
or affecting commerce."
BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REPORT No. 707, at D-5 (1975).
7K 348 U.S 115, 119-20 (1954).
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Moreover, as Mr. Justice Powell pointed out in Copp Paving, it
can equally logically be argued that the language refers only to the
power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. That view is proba-
bly correct since in Moore the Supreme Court -was dealing with a
Tenth Circuit dismissal of the complaint on the ground that § 2(a)
should not be read to cover the challenged discrimination because
such a reading would give the statute a scope taking it beyond the
commerce power."
The Court could have seized on a telling aspect of the legislaive
history surrounding the famous deletion of expansive language from
the Robinson-Patman Act.8" The conference report, in discussing that
deletion, suggests that Congress thought it had covered as much of
interstate or intrastate commerce as could constitutionally be
reached under the commerce power. For as the Copp Paving brief
quotes Congressman Utterbach:
This [expansive language] was omitted as the preceding lan-
guage already covers all discriminations, both interstate and
intrastate, that lie within the limits of federal authority.8
From this language, it might follow that Congress intended to reach
to the full limits of the Commerce Clause, as courts have expanded
and extended that reach, and thus that the elastic language of the
Robinson-Patman Act and the Clayton Act ought similarly to ex-
pand.
The problem is that, in coming back to the express language of
the Acts, it can only be concluded that the language is not elastic.
Whatever may be said with respect to the Sherman Act, the "in
commerce" language of the Clayton Act and the more specific and
more intricate commerce language of the Robinson-Patman Act do
not readily remake themselves as the prevailing view of the commerce
power changes. It is striking that as courts have altered their view of
the commerce power, they have not in a similar fashion altered their
interpretation of the commerce requirements of the Clayton and
Robinson-Patman Acts. While it is accepted statutory interpretation
not to follow the literal language of the statute if it is at war with the
express purpose, in the case of these Acts the purpose is hardly clearly
expressed, and there is more than one possible reason for the narrow
language actually adopted. There may well have been good and suffi-
cient policy reasons for raising the interstate commerce requirement
" Mead's Fine Bread Co. v. Moore, 208 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1953).
o See notes 55-57 and accompanying text, supra.
H.R. Report 2951, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. (1936).
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as a counterbalance to lowering the proof of anticompetitive effect.
So while the interpretations of the Court in Copp Paving and
American Building Maintenance are not free of doubt, they represent
reasonable and considered conclusions, which, in light of the predom-
inant judicial interpretation of these statutes in the lower courts, are
probably sound and are certainly preferable from the point of consist-
ency to guide the businessman.
The Court's reference in Copp Paving to the necessity of a "parti-
cularized judicial determination" that proceeds from "the circum-
stances presented in each case," is somewhat disquieting 2" The
Court, in applying the test to the Copp Paving facts, concluded that
the "nexus" theory is improper because the chain of connection, at
least as applied to the facts in that case, extends indefinitely, but
what is lacking is any attempt to articulate the degree of proximity
required before conduct may be said to be in interstate commerce.
The Court's allusions to "practical consequences" in preference to
"apparent and perhaps nominal connections" are unilluminating at
best. Mr. Justice Stewart attempted to fill the gap in American
Building Maintenance by setting out a verbal formulation that re-
quires, in order to be "in commerce," that a corporation must itself
be "directly engaged in the production, distribution, or acquisition of
goods or services in interstate commerce."83 Apparently the citation
of Copp Paving immediately following the formulation indicates that
the notion proceeds from Copp Paving. Yet the Copp Paving verbali-
zation is by no means a substitute for Justice Stewart's thought-a
fact in danger of being lost because of the citation to Copp Paving.4
" Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 197 n.12 (1974).
" 422 U.S. at 283, citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. at 186, 195
(1974).
" Mr. Justice Stewart cites the Copp Paving opinion at page 195. There the Court
said:
In contrast to § 1, the distinct "in commerce" language of the
Clayton and Robinson-Patman Act provisions with which we are con-
cerned here appears to denote only persons or activities within the
flow of interstate commerce-the practical, economic continuity in
the generation of goods and services for interstate markets and their
transport and distribution to the consumer. If this is so, the jurisdic-
tional requirements of these provisions cannot be satisfied merely by
showing that allegedly anticompetitive acquisitions and activities
affect commerce.
Id.
In this passage the Court refers to the "flow" of interstate commerce, to the
"practical, economic continuity in the generation of goods and services for interstate
markets." That this is a more stringent requirement than that of the "affecting com-
merce" doctrine is easily grasped, since through the latter the commerce power could
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Now that the Supreme Court has endorsed the prevailing view of
the lower courts on the reach of these statutes, several conclusions
that were widely held, though by no means certain, are firmly estab-
lished. The first is that the "underwriting" theory, governing the
situation in which localized acts are financed from the treasury of a
corporation operating in more than one state, has finally been laid to
rest. 5 One possible implication of this state of affairs is that clever
management by an interstate seller of goods can avoid the coverage
of § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act if the goods are held to have
"come to rest" within a single state before reshipment to retailers in
the same state. Because the Supreme Court has applied the "flow of
commerce" doctrine to that kind of situation,86 it will not always be
certain that local storage is sufficient to make the Robinson-Patman
Act inapplicable. But some courts in specialized situations of this sort
have found the "flow of commerce" had come to an end.87
Sales of commodities wihin the same state in which they are man-
ufactured are clearly not covered by the Act.8 Clearly, raw materials
shipped into a state that are substantially altered in form and then
resold to retailers within the state are beyond the reach of the Act.
Moreover, a careful stationing of distributorships or independent
sales subsidiaries can provide surer immunity from the Act. Assum-
ing the supplier itself does not sell across state lines, any price dis-
criminations by an autonomous local subsidiary or distributor be-
reach wholly intrastate transactions that never moved in the "flow" of interstate
commerce. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Nevertheless, even the
flow of interstate commerce can continue, indirectly, in transactions wholly intra-
state in nature. See Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564 (1943). Mr. Justice
Stewart in American Building Maintenance however, has stated that a corporation
must be "directly . . . in interstate commerce" and not merely in the flow of that
commerce.
Perhaps the most notable confrontation of the "underwriting" theory with the
prevailing judicial trend of interpretation of the commerce language in the Robinson-
Patman Act took place in Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 326 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Tex. 1971),
rev'd, 456 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1972), vacated on rehearing en banc, 483 F.2d 1140 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973). See Note, 86 HARv. L. REv. 765 (1973);
Comment, Robinson-Patman Act: "In Commerce" Jurisdictional Requirement
Broadened, 57 MINN. L. REV. 1035 (1973). For a critique of the prevailing judicial view,
see Salmon, The Robinson-Patman Act "Commercial" Requirement: The Emascula-
tion of Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread, 8 U.S.F.L. Rev. 497 (1974).
g' Standard Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
' Food Basket, Inc. v. Albertson's, Inc., 383 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1967).
E.g., Central Ice Cream Co. v. Golden Rod Ice Cream Co., 184 F. Supp. 312
(N.D. Ill. 1960), aff'd, 287 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1961); Lewis v. Shell Oil Co., 50 F. Supp.
547 (N.D. Ill. 1943).
" Bacon v. Texaco, Inc., 1974-2 Trade Cas. 75,358 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1005 (1975).
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tween customers within the state will be deemed to be sales by the
intrastate distributor, not the supplier, and therefore beyond the
commerce requirements of the Act." Indeed, one case suggests that,
at least in primary-line cases, an interstate firm whose low-price sales
originate entirely from within a single state to the detriment of a local
competitor is beyond the reach of the Act even though that same
defendant also made interstate shipment from outside the state into
areas of the state in which the local competitor did not compete.',
But whatever the implications, the Supreme Court has resolved
any remaining doubts as to the reach of the Robinson-Patman Act's
interstate commerce requirement. While ambiguity remains in the
application of the Clayton Act, the direction this Court would take
is now clearly indicated.
II.
GOLDFARB-ANTTRUST AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
When the Goldfarbs, a Fairfax County, Virginia, couple, chal-
lenged the minimum fee schedule promulgated by the Fairfax County
Bar Association, they challenged a practice of long standing in the
legal profession. It has been estimated that some 30 states and
hundreds of local bar associations had adopted minimum fee sched-
ules to advise their members of appropriate fee levels. 2 Fee schedules
have most frequently been advisory, suggesting minimum fees for a
variety of legal services and also for hourly and contingency rates. A
large segment of the bar quite obviously has never used these sched-
ules, but it is probable that many lawyers have referred to such
schedules as an aid in calculating fees. What removed these schedules
from the realm of pure suggestion was the common tendency to think
of lawyers who customarily undercut the minimum fee schedules as
0 Borden Co. v. F.T.C., 339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964); cf. Rosemound Sand &
Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand & Gravel Co., 469 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1972); Abramson v.
Colonial Oil Co., 390 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 831 (1968).
The Federal Trade Commission has decided that an independent intrastate sub-
sidiary is beyond the Robinson-Patman Act. E.g., Dan Dee Pretzel & Potato Chip Co.,
54 F.T.C. 1844 (1958).
11 Willard Dairy Corp. v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 309 F.2d 943 (6th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 934 (1963).
92 Note, A Critical Analysis of Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules, 85 Harv.
L. Rev. 971 (1972). In connection with the discussion of Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
the reader should be aware that the author participated in the case as counsel for one
of the parties. Accordingly, inasmuch as certain aspects of the case are still in litiga-
tion, this brief discussion will be confined to those aspects that are now concluded.
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engaging in a professionally unethical practice." Only in recent years
have state and local bar associations begun to abandon the use of
such schedules. 4
Virginia was therefore hardly unique in its use of minimum fee
schedules. The Virginia General Assembly has empowered the Su-
preme Court of Virginia to prescribe a code of ethics governing the
professional conduct of lawyers and to establish appropriate discipli-
nary procedures. 5 Accordingly, the Supreme Court had adopted and
promulgated Canons of Ethics and, subsequently, the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility of the Virginia State Bar. Included in the Code
of Professional Responsibility were specific references to suggested fee
schedules." These references and the general scheme of enforcement
supporting the disciplinary rules at the minimum suggest official
approval of the minimum fee schedule concept. In combination with
the opinions issued by the State Bar that provided disciplinary proce-
dures for consistent undercutting of such fee schedules," the Virginia
rules seemed to provide a basis for the issuance of suggested mini-
mum fee schedules by local bar associations." These were the ethical
rules governing the practice of law in Fairfax County when the Gold-
farbs sought the services of a lawyer in connection with the purchase
of a new home.
93 See ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinions, Nos. 302 (1961), 585
(1962) and 323 (1970). Opinion No. 323, while conceding that undercutting alone can-
not be the basis for a charge of unethical behavior, declares that undercutting com-
bined with other evidence may be sufficient. In the context of the Goldfarb case, the
Virginia State Bar issued an opinion to the effect that a form of prohibited personal
solicitation occurs when an attorney, for the purpose of increasing his legal business,
intentionally and regularly charges less than the customary charges of the local bar
for similar services, as reflected in a schedule of suggested minimum fees. Virginia
State Bar Opinion No. 98 (June 1, 1960). In Opinion No. 170, the Bar determined that
advisory fee schedules are one element to be considered in determining a proper fee,
and that habitual charging of less than the minimum fee schedule for the purpose of
solicitation may constitute evidence of professional misconduct. Virginia State Bar
Opinion No. 170 (May 28, 1971).
" Note, Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules and the Antitrust Laws, 1974
DUKE L.J. 1164, 1166 (1974).
"5 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
" See, e.g., EC-218: "Suggested fee schedules and economic reports of state and
local bar associations provide some guidance on the subject of reasonable fees.
"7 See note 93, supra.
" Another instance of state approval in Virginia occurred in 1962 and 1969, when
the State Bar published Minimum Fee Schedule Reports setting forth existing fee
schedules promulgated by various local bar associations. The 1969 Report stated:
The recommended minimum fee figures in the Committee's report
represent the consensus recommendation of members of the Commit-
tee as to fees which should be assessed in 1969 for the legal services
indicated.
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To obtain a mortgage, the Goldfarbs were required to purchase
title insurance, and thus to retain an attorney to search the title.
They contacted a local attorney and indicated a desire to minimize
costs. The attorney responded that it was the policy of his office to
keep charges "in line" with the minimum fee schedule of the local
bar association. The Goldfarbs then surveyed 36 other lawyers to
inquire about fees for title examination services, and received 19
written replies generally suggesting adherence to the local fee sched-
ule. As a result, the Goldfarbs ended up paying the original attorney
contacted $522.50 for a title examination-precisely the amount
called for under the minimum fee schedule promulgated by the Fair-
fax County Bar Association."
The Goldfarbs brought a class action against the Fairfax County
Bar Association, the local association that had issued the suggested
fee schedule, and the Virginia State Bar, charging that the promulga-
tion of such a schedule constituted a violation of § 1 of the Sherman
Act.' 0 After a trial on the issue of liability, the district court held that
the minimum fee schedule violated the Sherman Act.' °'
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed.'02 The circuit court held that the Sherman Act was
inapplicable because as a matter of law the advisory minimum fee
schedule did not have a sufficient effect upon interstate trade or
commerce, and, in addition, because the practice of law was a learned
profession and thus not "trade or commerce" within the meaning of
§ 1 of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court granted the petition for
certiorari,'0 3 and, in its own words, was:
9 The Fairfax County Bar Association minimum fee schedule was promulgated
in 1969 together with the bar associations of Loudoun and Arlington Counties and the
City of Alexandria. For title examinations, the fee schedule called for a minimum fee
of 1% of the first $50,000 of the loan or purchase price, whichever is greater, one-half
of 1% from $50,000 to $100,000, one-quarter of 1% between $100,000 and $1,000,000 and
a negotiated amount above $1,000,000.
'- 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). The suit sought treble damages and injunctive relief
pursuant to §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1970).
"1 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973). The trial court held that the role of the state
agencies, including the Virginia State Bar, was state action exempt from antitrust
challenge under the authority of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Accordingly, it
dismissed the action as to the State Bar, leaving the local bar association the only
defendant in the case.
The damage issue was severed and remains to be tried.
102 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974). The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit occasioned considerable comment. See, e.g., Note, Bar Association Minimum
Fee Schedules and the Antitrust Laws, 1974 DUKE L. J. 1164 (1974); Note, Minimum
Fee Schedules-The Battle and the War: Goldfarb at the Fourth Circuit, 60 VA. L.
REV. 1415 (1974); Fourth Circuit Review, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 417, 419 (1975).
' 419 U.S. 963 (1974).
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[t]hus confronted for the first time with the question of
whether the Sherman Act applies to services performed by
attorneys in examining titles in connection with financing the
purchase of real estate.' 4
Chief Justice Burger, speaking for a unanimous Court, reversed
and held that the promulgation of a minimum fee schedule by law-
yers was a violation of § 1 of theSherman Act."0 5 The Supreme Court's
opinion viewed the publication of the minimum fee schedule as price
fixing, and held that there was a sufficient effect on interstate trade
or commerce to trigger applicability of the Sherman Act, and that
there was no exemption conferred on the fee schedule by virtue of the
state action exemption doctrine of Parker v. Brown."' Finally, the
Supreme Court held that the so-called learned profession exemption
did not exist.
A. Lawyers' Minimum Fee Schedules as Price Fixing
Price fixing is a per se violation of the Sherman Act."' Thus, an
agreement by members of a bar association to adhere to a schedule
of prices would be a classic case of price fixing, leaving aside the
questions of immunity, exemption or effect on interstate commerce.
The County Bar, however, argued that the advisory fee schedule was
promulgated only to enable members to comply with ethical regula-
tions, and was not accompanied by any agreement to adhere to the
suggested fees.
Chief Justice Burger agreed that a purely advisory fee schedule,
to provide guidelines or to facilitate an exchange of general price
information, would present a different case." 8 But the Chief Justice
101 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 780 (1975).
I !d.
317 U.S. 341 (1943).
107 Although § 1 of the Sherman Act outlaws restraints of trade, in general only
unreasonable restraints actually violate the statute. Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1 (1911). Some practices, however, are regarded as so inherently anticompeti-
tive that they are deemed to be per se violations, and inquiry into their reasonableness
in a particular case is not permitted. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1 (1958). Price fixing is in this category. United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392
(1927).
I" The opinion cites in that connection American Column and Lumber Co. v.
United States, 256 U.S. 377 (1921) and Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States,
268 U.S. 563, 580 (1925). But it also cites United States v. National Ass'n of Real
Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (1950), in which the Supreme Court held unlawful a
.'suggested" price schedule, without enforcement mechanisms, because "[slubtle in-
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viewed the facts presented in Goldfarb as a classic illustration of price
fixing. First, in the view of the majority, a purely advisory fee sched-
ule would not include the "fixed, rigid price floor" found in the
Fairfax schedule, nor would it be framed in terms of future transac-
tions rather than past standards. Second, the enforcement mecha-
nism provided by the State Bar was re-enforced by the "assurance
that other lawyers would not compete by underbidding."'' Conclud-
ing that the price stabilizing activities of the bar associations in
Goldfarb were "unusually damaging" because consumers purchasing
homes necessarily were unable to escape the effects of the minimum
fee schedules, the Court decided that the promulgation of the sched-
ule was an agreement to fix prices with a substantial effect on compe-
tition." '0
Whatever the merits of the Court's analysis of the facts presented
in Goldfarb, the suggestion that a pure exchange of information or a
wholly advisory fee schedule, not backed up by disciplinary rules and
regulations, would present a different case is intriguing."' The dis-
semination of fee information for giving legal services within a partic-
ular community would be analogous to trade association publication
of industry statistics, which has been generally approved by the Su-
preme Court."' Lawyers will be given some pause, however, by
United States v. Container Corp. of America,"' in which an informa-
tion exchange program involving the most recent prices charged to
specific customers was held to have violated the Sherman Act.",
fluences may be just as effective as the threat of use of formal sanctions to hold people
in line." Id. at 489.
421 U.S. at 781-82.
1,0 Id. at 782-83.
" The suggestion may be wholly illusory in the case of bar associations that have
had minimum fee schedules since this would be sufficient evidence of past "price
fixing" which, when combined with exchange of information and uniformity of price,
might under available precedent be enough to trigger Sherman Act liability. See, e.g.,
Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 929 (1952).
"I See, e.g., Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925);
United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923).
"1 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
"I Upon requests from competitors, the appellees in Container furnished informa-
tion as to the most recent price charged or quoted, with the expectation of reciprocity
and with the understanding that quotes represented the price currently being bid. The
appellees requested such information from their competitors only when unable to
obtain it from another source. Although recognizing that the exchange of price infor-
mation did not involve an agreement to adhere to a price schedule, id. at 334, the Court
nonetheless found that the exchange of such information tended to stabilize prices
within a "narrow ambit." Thus, the Court reasoned, the exchange had an anticompeti-
tive effect. Id. at 336-37. The Court held that the reciprocal exchange of price informa-
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Even the language of that case, however, suggests that appropriate
information exchanges in the context of the legal profession might
well escape censure:
Price information exchanged in some markets may have no
effect upon a truly competitive price. But the corrugated con-
tainer industry is dominated by relatively few sellers. The
product is fungible and the competition for sales is price. The
demand is inelastic. .... 1.1
Given the care taken by the Court to avoid overruling or limiting
Maple Flooring, the result seems to be that the Supreme Court is still
of the view that the "peculiar circumstances of each case" must be
examined;"' and if the structure of the industry, the nature of the
product and the mode of competition are the relevant factors, as
Container suggests, the legal profession may well not be the kind of
industry in which the Supreme Court is likely to find that a price
information exchange has a harmful effect.
For instance, in contrast to the findings concerning the corrugated
container industry, which was said to be dominated by relatively few
sellers, the legal profession resembles much more closely the market
for agricultural commodities, in which the number of sellers is so
large that a variation in price by any one of them will have no effect
whatever." 7 Similarly lawyers are not fungible although it can be
tion was concerted action sufficient to establish the combination or conspiracy ingredi-
ent of § 1, and that the resulting price stabilization had an anticompetitive effect,
chilling the vigor of price competition.
The implications of the Container decisqon for each element of a § 1 violation are
discussed in Comment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 227 (1969).
"1 393 U.S. at 337. The Supreme Court has noted that "the collection and dissemi-
nation of trade statistics are in themselves permissible and may be a useful adjunct of
fair commerce . Sugar Institute, Inc., v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 599-600
(1936).
"' Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 585 (1925). In Maple
Flooring, the exchange of average cost data, freight rates, and summary sales statistics
was held not to constitute an unlawful restraint on commerce. The sales statistics,
which included price information, embraced only past and closed transactions and did
not include either the names of purchasers or current prices. The information was
transmitted to the members in summarized form by the secretary of the Association,
without revealing the identity of members in connection with the information trans-
mitted. The Court explained that "the members of trade associations [do not become]
conspirators merely because they gather and disseminate information . . . bearing on
the business in which they are engaged and make use of it in the management and
control of their individual businesses . . . ." Id. at 584.
"I On the other hand, an enterprising plaintiff's attorney might theorize that
within the market for legal services there are certain oligopolistic submarkets, domi-
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argued that for certain simple legal services, such as the preparation
of a simple will, an incorporation, or a name change, the products are
fungible. Moreover, competition at least historically has not de-
pended on price, even in the absence of minimum fee schedules."'
In such a market situation, assuming that Container does not
articulate a per se rule,"' it seems likely that at least some of the
purposes offered as justifications for the institution of the minimum
fee schedules could be achieved by this more restricted form of infor-
mation exchange.' 0 It can legitimately be argued that availability of
price information can be crucial to the consumer, who thereby is able
to discuss fees with a lawyer armed with some knowledge of the norm.
New lawyers charging fees for the first time, or lawyers newly arrived
in a community have a proper interest in the general level of fees in
that community. Finally, judges required to award reasonable attor-
neys' fees can use available fee information."'
nated by large, urban law firms. A court accepting this theory might find an antitrust
violation, relying on Container's implication that in an oligopolistic market an ex-
change of fee information would necessarily have an illegal chilling effect on competi-
tive pricing. See 393 U.S. at 337.
"' Some assign as a reason for that observable fact the ethical strictures against
lawyer advertising now being challenged in a variety of cases brought under the anti-
trust laws or the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
E.g., Consumers Union, Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, No. 75-0105 R. (E.D. Va., filed
Feb. 27, 1975) (alleging that rules prohibiting the publication of lawyers' fees violate
the first and fourteenth amendment rights of consumers and consumer organizations);
Person v. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, No. 75-C-987 (E.D.N.Y., June 23,
1975) (alleging that advertising restrictions violate § 1 of the Sherman Act, the first
amendment, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)). See BNA
ANTITRUST & TR. REG. REPORT No. 720 at A-10 (1975). Furthermore, senior officials
within the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department have warned that the advertis-
ing rules may be subject to antitrust attack. Id. at A-7. An ABA committee has
recently recommended that the advertising ban be dropped and that ethical codes be
changed to permit responsible publicity. Id. No. 720, at A-19.
The first amendment issues raised by these suits may be clarified by the Supreme
Court in a case dealing with the constitutionality of laws prohibiting the advertisement
of prescription drug prices. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of
Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Va. 1974), prob. juris. noted, 420 U.S. 971 (1975).
"I Lower courts do not appear to construe it as a per se rule. See, e.g., Wall
Products Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
' For an analysis of the social and economic aspects of these justifications, see
Note, A Critical Analysis of BarAssociation Minimum Fee Schedules, 85 HARV. L. REV.
971 (1972).
"I Numerous state court decisions have approved the use of minimum fee sched-
ules as persuasive evidence of a reasonable fee. See, e.g., Junker v. Junker, 188 Neb.
555, 198 N.W.2d 189 (1972); State ex rel. Baker v. County Court, 29 Wis.2d 1, 138
N.W.2d 162 (1965); Buckles v. Continental Cash. Co., 197 Ore. 128, 252 P.2d 184
(1953); Succession of Weil, 205 La. 214, 17 So.2d 255 (1944); Broughton v. Nance, 244
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Presumably, those valid purposes would be weighed in any assess-
ment of the "peculiar circumstances of each case" and might well
provide the different case to which Chief Justice Burger alluded in
the Goldfarb opinion. There would seem to be little reason why such
activities should be permitted to industrialists in the trade associa-
tion context but denied to lawyers in the bar association context.
B. Effect on Interstate Commerce
Price fixing may not violate § 1 of the Sherman Act if it does not
restrain trade "among the several states." The acts complained of
must either (1) occur within the flow of interstate commerce, 22 or (2)
substantially affect interstate commerce.'2 Because the Goldfarbs
conceded that the activities of the local bar association did not occur
within the flow of interstate commerce, the question for determina-
tion in Goldfarb was whether the challenged activities met the
"substantial effect" test.
The Fairfax County Bar Association contended ii the Supreme
Court, as the Fourth Circuit had held,2 4 that the promulgation of an
advisory fee for title examination did not have a substantial effect
upon interstate commerce. The local bar association argued that no
proof whatever of any actual effect could be found in the record and
that since every aspect of the Goldfarbs' purchase of a home occurred
in Virginia, no proof could have been shown.1
5
Ala. 499, 14 So.2d 505 (1943); Cox v. State Ind. Accident Comm., 168 Ore. 508, 123
P.2d 800 (1942).
"22 Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732, 739 n.3
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S.
218 (1947).
"I Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219,
234 (1948):
[G]iven a restraint of the type forbidden by the Act, though arising
in the course of intrastate or local activities, and a showing of actual
or threatened effect upon interstate commerce, the vital question be-
comes whether the effect is sufficiently substantial and adverse to
Congress' paramount policy declared in the Act's terms to constitute
a forbidden consequence.
Whether the alleged restraint can be said to cause a substantial adverse effect on
interstate commerce must be determined on examination of the record. See Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 202-03 (1974).
124 497 F.2d 1, 15-18 (4th Cir. 1974). The District Court, however, had been satis-
fied that interstate commerce was sufficiently affected to sustain jurisdiction under the
Sherman Act. 355 F. Supp. 491, 497 (E.D. Va. 1973).
"2 421 U.S. at 783. The Goldfarbs resided in Virginia prior to their purchase of a
new home, all transactions relating to the purchase of the home, including the negotia-
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Moreover, the Fairfax Bar Association argued that courts have
often examined whether a challenged activity was "essentially local,"
and a finding of that sort might suggest the absence of sufficient
effect on interstate commerce.' Finally, the local bar association
contended that the "effect on commerce" test required a "substan-
tial" effect.2' The fact that home buyers, mortgage money and loan
guarantees may in some other cases cross state lines was character-
ized as merely incidental and remote from a lawyer's examination of
title to the property. Accordingly, under the "substantial effect" for-
mulation, the Fairfax Bar Association contended, the issuance of the
minimum fee schedule was without the requisite effect on interstate
commerce.
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit on the interstate
commerce point. 2 8 For Chief Justice Burger, the arguments of the
Fairfax County Bar Association misconceived the nature of the role
of legal services in real estate transactions. The district court had
found that a significant portion of funds for the purchase of homes
in Fairfax County came from outside Virginia and that loans on Fair-
fax County real estate were frequently guaranteed by agencies of the
United States Government headquartered in the District of Colum-
bia.'2 For the Court, it was appropriate to infer that some plaintiffs
in the class were required to take the title search services because of
these interstate transactions.
The necessary connection between the interstate transactions
and the restraint of trade provided by the minimum fee sched-
ule is present because, in a practical sense, title examinations
are necessary in real estate transactions to assure a lien on a
tion for sale, contract of sale, title examination, securing mortgage loan, settlement
and all legal services occurred within Virginia.
In 421 U.S. at 784 n.13. See, e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218,
231 (1947); Lawson v. Woodmere, Inc., 217 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1954); Diversified Broker-
age Services, Inc. v. Neil Adamson Co., 1974-2 Trade Cas. 1 75, 362 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
I" Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323, 333-34 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961)
(the challenged conduct must have a "direct and substantial, and not merely inconse-
quential, remote or fortuitous" effect on interstate commerce); see, e.g., Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948); Rosemound
Sand & Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand & Gravel Co., 469 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Bensinger Co., 430 F.2d 584, 588 (8th Cir. 1970); Diversified Brokerage
Services, Inc. v. Neil Adamson Co., 1974-2 Trade Cas. 75, 362 (S.D. Iowa 1974). The
Fourth Circuit accepted this argument. 497 F.2d at 17 n.51.
In 421 U.S. 783-85.
129 355 F. Supp. at 494. The Court of Appeals did not disturb the district court's
findings of fact, but rather disagreed with its conclusions of law. 497 F.2d at 16.
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valid title of the borrower .... Thus a title examination is an
integral part of an interstate transaction. .... 130
Consequently the Court concluded that where legal services are as a
matter of law or practical necessity an "integral" part of an interstate
transaction, a restraint on those services may substantially affect
commerce for Sherman Act purposes. 3'
An examination of the treatment of the interstate commerce issue
suggests that the Court was resolved not to be deflected from its
analysis of the minimum fee schedules by jurisdictional technicali-
ties. Beyond that, it is difficult to be very clear about the import of
the decision.
The cases cited by the Court to support its "nexus" holding are
hardly very strong. Indeed, its discussion of United States v. Yellow
Cab, 3 1 on which the local bar association relied heavily, is confusing.
Chief Justice Burger rejected the analogy between the search of title
in a real estate transaction and the intrastate taxi ride from home to
railroad station that frequently initiates an interstate railroad jour-
ney. 33 While that journey for many people is an "integral" part of the
trip, the Supreme Court found it distinct and separate in terms of
"time and continuity." Why it is any more distinct and separate than
is a title search in connection with the purchase of a home does not
emerge clearly from the opinion. Both the taxi cab ride and the title
search are distinct in time, though related; they involve different
individuals from the principal transactions; in terms of continuity,
they are indistinguishable.
Other cases cited by the Court are equally infirm precedents.
United States v. Frankfort Distilleries34 concerned a conspiracy to
compel interstate producers of alcoholic beverages to enter into price
maintenance contracts, which is a radically different situation from
that present in Goldfarb. Mortague & Co. v. Lowery 31 likewise dealt
with refusals by interstate sellers of tile to deal with a California
customer. Even United States v. Women's Sportswear Manufactur-
ers Association"6 involved a restraint operating directly on
admittedly interstate commerce. As such, none of these cases illumi-
'3o 421 U.S.at 783-84 (footnotes omitted).
"' Id. at 785.
132 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
421 U.S. at 784 n.13.
1 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
' 193 U.S. 38 (1904).
136 336 U.S. 460 (1949). The Court discussed this case and those cited at notes 134
and 135 supra, in 421 U.S. at 784-85.
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nate the degree of connection required between a restraint and inter-
state commerce before it can meet the Sherman Act standard of
effect. In fact, reading them at face value and as traditionally inter-
preted, the cases might be thought weak in their support of the
Court's conclusion.
If one accepts the premise that all services necessarily connected
with the interstate purchase of a home are part of interstate com-
merce, "I presumably the same logic would apply to a variety of
activities hitherto thought wholly intrastate and without any effect
on interstate commerce. Under the Court's reasoning, it may well be
that the sort of termite inspection nearly universal in certain parts
of the country in connection with the sale of houses is in interstate
commerce. But the portion of the journey bringing the new homeown-
ers from railroad stationto the new home is beyond the reach of the
Sherman Act. Whether this paradoxical state of affairs leads one to
have much confidence in the "particularized judicial determination"
called for by Mr. Justice Powell in Copp Paving is very much in
doubt.
C. State Action Exemption
A restraint of trade, otherwise unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman
Act, may be saved in certain circumstances by the state action ex-
emption.' 3 Because minimum fee schedules in some states are asso-
ciated with the state's regulation of the legal profession, the question
of state action exemption must ordinarily be confronted in dealing
with the fee schedule issue.
The Fourth Circuit had affirmed the district court's conclusion
that the State Bar was not liable because its conduct was state ac-
"I There has been little unanimity among the federal courts concerning the inter-
state character of real estate transactions and mortgage lending institution activities.
See Marston v. Property Managers Ass'n, 422 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1970) (per curiam);
Bratcher v. Bd. of Realtors, 381 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1967) (per curiam); Stavrides v.
Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 353 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 487 F.2d 953 (3d
Cir. 1973); Cotillion Club, Inc. v. Real Estate Bd., 303 F. Supp. 850 (E.D. Mich. 1964);
United States v. Chicago Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 123 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Il. 1954).
'" Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The precise contours of the exemption
are unclear and courts have defined the requirements for coming within the scope of
the exemption in different ways. Compare, E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachu-
setts Port Authority, 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966), with
George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970). See 16 J. vONKALINOWSKI, BusiNEss ORGANIZATIONS §
46.03 (1975); Comment, 71 COLUM. L. Rzv. 140 (1971); Comment, 55 VA. L. Rav. 325
(1969).
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tion, and therefore exempt from Sherman Act applicability. Specifi-
cally, the court held that the State Bar role met three standards for
valid state action: the State Bar's activity was for the benefit of the
public, took place as the result of legislative command, and was
actively supervised by the state.3' The Fourth Circuit found that
while the Fairfax County Bar Association intended its fee schedule
to be of benefit to the public, it was neither actively supervised by
the state nor did it receive its efficacy from legislative command.
Therefore, its activity was not exempt under the doctrine of Parker
v. Brown.40
Chief Justice Burger found it unnecessary to engage in a complete
Parker v. Brown analysis since in his view the case never got past the
threshold inquiry. For the majority, the initial question in determin-
ing whether Parker was applicable was whether the alleged anticom-
petitive activity, said to be state action exempt from Sherman Act
liability, "is required by the State acting as sovereign."''
Because minimum fee schedules in Virginia were required neither
by legislative enactment nor Supreme Court rule, the Court ruled,
their promulgation by the State Bar and the local bar association was
not an activity "required by the State acting as sovereign." Mere
mention of schedules in ethical codes put into effect by the Supreme
Court was no sufficient, nor was the apparent approval of minimum
fee schedules by the State Bar pursuant to delegation by the Virginia
Supreme Court of the power to issue ethical opinions.
It is not enough that, as the initial County Bar puts it, anti-
competitive conduct is "prompted" by state action; rather,
anticompetitive activities must be compelled by direction of
the State acting as a sovereign."'
Then came the startling aspect of the Court's handling of the
Parker issue. Although the Fourth Circuit had held the actions of the
State Bar exempt as a state agency,' the Supreme Court declined
to confer the exemption on the State Bar and held it liable along with
the local bar association.
497 F.2d at 4-12.
140 Id. at 12-13.
421 U.S. at 790.
142 Id. at 791.
", Even dissenting Judge Craven had declined to find liability because, in his
view, the participation of the State Bar in the matter was of minimal importance. 497
F.2d at 21 (Craven, J., concurring and dissenting).
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The fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited
purposes does not create an antitrust shield that allows it to
foster anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its mem-
bers.4 4
Because the State Bar had supplied the disciplinary support for pre-
venting deviation from the county bar minimum fees, the Supreme
Court viewed it as having volunteered to join in what otherwise would
have been a totally private anticompetitive activity. In that posture,
the State Bar could not claim Sherman Act exemption.14 5
The Supreme Court's view, while justifiable under Parker, may
not be wholly realistic. Neither legislature nor Supreme Court in
Virginia, or in any other state, is in session year round, and much of
the business of state government-as at any other level of govern-
ment-is delegated to subsidiary agencies. Particularly in the regu-
lated sector of the economy, state agencies are established to do the
job of regulating, and are expected to implement the regulatory
scheme without detailed instructions from the legislature.
In the legal profession, in Virginia, the legislature and the Su-
preme Court established a state agency to regulate the profession.
This agency, the State Bar, undertook to regulate the profession
armed with such policy direction as the legislature and the Supreme
Court were able to furnish. 146 Admittedly, there have been no direct
'" 421 U.S. at 791 (footnote omitted).
'4 Id. at 791-92. The Supreme Court opinion cites the State Bar's fee schedule
reports as providing the impetus, on at least two occasions, for the adoption of the
minimum fee schedules by the Fairfax County Bar Association. Moreover, the State
Bar's ethical opinions gave lawyers every reason to adhere to the schedules because
the threat of professional discipline for their disregard was clear. The opinions without
the threat would have induced compliance, in the view of the Supreme Court, because
lawyers would be unlikely to risk departure from what was considered to be ethical
professional behavior. Id. at 791 n.21.
"' Those guidelines in Virginia included the Canons of Ethics and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, both promulgated by the Supreme Court. Canon 12 of the
Canons of Ethics provided that, in setting a fee, a lawyer may properly consider, among
other things, "the customary charges of the Bar for similar services." Canon 12 went
on to provide that, in determining those customer charges, a lawyer could properly
"consider a schedule of minimum fees adopted by a Bar Association." Moreover, the
Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, which succeeded the Canons of Ethics in
1971 and was adopted as part of the Virginia Supreme Court Rules, provides that
"suggested fee schedules and economic reports of state and local bar associations
provide some guidance on the subject of reasonable fees." Virginia Code of Professional
Responsibility, EC 2-18. Similarly DR 2-106(B) (3) of the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility provides that one factor to be considered in determining the reasonableness of
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orders that bar associations shall adopt minimum fee schedules, but
there is clear evidence of consistent approval of the minimum fee
schedule concept.
Armed with that approval, it can be argued that the State Bar
undertakes a regulatory role. Among its actions are the issuance of
advisory opinions, at least two of which seem to demonstrate the
intention to prohibit personal solicitation, an ethics offense, by the
use of minimum fee schedules. 4 ' Both opinions rely upon the fee
schedule concept and declare that consistent disregard of the mini-
mum fee provided in a local advisory schedule may constitute evi-
dence of professional misconduct if it is undertaken for the purpose
of solicitation. Furthermore, the State Bar published Minimum Fee
Schedule Reports. The 1969 Report included language making clear
that the State Bar Committee was recommending reasonable fees for
certain legal services."'
What existed in Goldfarb, then, was policy direction from the
State "acting as sovereign" and regulatory activity by the State Bar.
To say that minimum fee schedules were not required by the Su-
preme Court, while technically correct, somewhat misses the point.
To those whose conduct was regulated by the State Bar, there was
likely very little question where the Commonwealth of Viiginia stood
on the issue. No Virginia lawyer could afford to anticipate the Su-
preme Court's disregard of the clear policy directions, which governed
those lawyers for all practical purposes, in favor of some requirement
of an explicit mandate.
Moreover, the Court's surprising announcement that the State
Bar should not be considered a state agency for the purpose of this
case requires some examination. Chief Justice Burger agreed that the
State Bar was a state agency "for some limited purposes ... .
Presumably, those "limited purposes" include the regulation of the
ethical practices of the legal profession, which is precisely what the
State Bar was doing by issuing its ethical opinions and minimum fee
schedule reports. Furthermore, the notion that a state agency can lose
its state identity for certain purposes, according to a set of standards
that are not clearly defined anywhere in the Court's opinion, is puz-
zling, and is not really illuminated by the citations in the opinion."'
a fee is "[tlhe fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services."
Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-106(B)(3).
" Virginia State Bar Opinion Nos. 98 (June 1, 1960) and 170 (May 28, 1971).
US Minimum Fee Schedule Report for Virginia State Bar (1969).
"' 421 U.S. at 791.
' The Court cited Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973). But in that
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In addition, the Supreme Court stated that the State Bar's fee
schedule reports "provided the impetus for the county bar, on two
occasions, to adopt minimum fee schedules."' 5 ' Assuming the State
Bar to be a state agency with regulatory power over the legal profes-
sion, it must have seemed to the local bar association that the State
Bar's recommendation as to reasonable fees, together with the allu-
sion to minimum fee schedules in the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility, constituted a strong indication that minimum fee schedules
were to be adopted in the local communities. To say after all of this,
as Chief Justice Burger did, that what is involved is "essentially a
private anticompetitive activity" joined voluntarily by the State Bar
is a distinctively original assessment of the facts in the case.' 52
The import of the Court's opinion is that a state legislature can
authorize a minimum fee schedule on a statewide basis by explicit
enactment. It seems clear that a legislature may not permit blatantly
anticompetitive activity without some special justification.'53 But
where a state legislature, after the Goldfarb decision, had determined
the minimum fee schedule concept for good faith polity reasons, it
would require a bold judge indeed to overturn the statute on Sherman
Act grounds.' 5 Whether any legislature will take that step, however,
is very much open to doubt.
D. Learned Profession Exemption
For the first time, the Supreme Court squarely faced the issue
whether there existed a "learned profession" exemption from the
case, in the context of a hearing by the Alabama State Board of Optometry in connec-
tion with the possible revocation of licenses to practice optometry, the Supreme Court
held that the Board was disqualified on grounds of possible personal interest. The case
is therefore not very instructive, since no adjudicative hearing was involved in
Goldfarb-indeed no disciplinary proceeding involving minimum fee schedules had
ever been instituted in Virginia-and the notion of pecuniary self interest, fairly clear
in Berryhill, was virtually totally absent with the State Bar. While the State Bar is
governed by practicing lawyers, it includes all practicing lawyers in the state, as the
Alabama State Board of Optometry did not include all optometrists and the financial
status of the leaders of the State Bar would in no way be affected by the presence or
absence of the minimum fee schedule concept. Finally, in Berryhill, the State Board
had filed the same case in a state court seeking an injunction against the practices
complained of, leading the Supreme Court to doubt its total objectivity in the subse-
quent hearing. This factor was totally absent in Goldfarb.
'"' 421 U.S. at 791 n.21.
252 Id. at 792.
' Cf. Norman's On the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir.
1971).
' Cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1966).
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antitrust laws. 5 ' In other cases, from time to time, the issue had been
briefly touched on in passing.5 ' In Goldfarb, however, a square hold-
ing on the subject was necessary, since anticompetitive activity by
lawyers might still have been lawful if governed by the exemption.
Two major arguments proposing some form of learned profession
exemption were presented to the Court. First, it was argued that the
Sherman Act, extending only to trade or commerce, did not embrace
the learned professions, both as a matter of congressional intent and
also in line with the interpretation of that statute by judicial con-
struction. Second, it was suggested that even though a total exemp-
tion might not exist, the status of the learned professions and the
competing policies reflected by professional regulation necessitated a
different treatment of restrictions in the professional context than in
the normal industrial context. In effect, it was argued that courts
ought to assess individual restrictions on their merits, weighing their
justifications, rather than assuming that the per se rules applicable
in other contexts ought mechanically to be applied in the case of the
learned professions.
The Supreme Court concluded there was no total exemption from
the Sherman Act. On the premise that Congress had intended to
reach as far as it could under the Commerce Clause, Chief Justice
Burger stated that no exclusion was intended and that there was
nothing inherent in a learned profession that rendered it unfit for
antitrust treatment. Moreover, the Court did not accept the sugges-
tion that the restrictions on the legal profession were for the benefit
of the public. Instead, the Court concluded that the practice of law
has a business aspect and that these aspects are controlled by the
antitrust laws.
In the modern world it cannot be denied that the activities of
lawyers play an important part in commercial intercourse, and
that anticompetitive activities by lawyers may exert a re-
straint on commerce.
57
Then, in a footnote that may become as famous as the original
footnote 17, the Court may have agreed with the second aspect of the
"I' 421 U.S. at 785-88.
151 See, e.g., United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326, 336
(1952); United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 492 (1950);
American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943); Semler v. Oregon
State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers,
Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 436 (1932).
" 421 U.S. at 788.
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learned profession exemption argument, namely that the learned pro-
fessions deserved special treatment under the antitrust laws:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distin-
guished from a business is, of course, relevant in determining
whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It
would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as inter-
changeable with other business activities, and automatically
to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated
in other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of
the professions, may require that a particular practice, which
could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in
another context, be treated differently. 5 '
The Court was, however, careful to say that it was expressing its
views only on the situation presented in Goldfarb."'
Footnote 17 will undoubtedly turn out to be crucial. If the- Court
had simply declared that no learned profession exemption existed, it
would have been open to lower courts to infer that no special treat-
ment for professions was to be permitted. Nevertheless, both the local
bar association and the Goldfarbs argued in their briefs before the
Court that some form of special treatment, taking into account the
public interest aspects of the profession, ought to be balanced against
the policies of the antitrust laws.
For instance, the question of price advertising, now very clearly
in controversy in a number of courts,6 ' prohibited by clear rules of
ethics of the legal profession, would be treated quite differently under
' Id. at 787-88 n.17.
'9 Interestingly, this mode of analysis is different from the approach adopted in
Gordon and NASD, where immunity rather than modified application of the antitrust
laws was chosen. See text accompanying notes 202-22 infra. But cf. Jocobi v. Bache &
Co., Inc., 520 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1975).
'1 See, e.g., New York Pub. Interest Research Group v. Regents, No. 74-2260 (2d
Cir., March 17, 1975) (per curiam) (allowing pharmacists to intervene as of right in
action seeking to enjoin enforcementof state regulation prohibiting price advertising
of prescription drugs); Person v. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, No. 75-C-
987 (E.D.N.Y., June 23, 1975); Consumers Union, Inc. v. American Bar Association,
No. 75-0105-R (E.D. Va. February 27, 1975); Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc.
v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Va. 1974), prob. juris. noted, 429
U.S. 971 (1975), argued Nov. 11, 1975, 44 U.S.L.W. 3297; Mississippi State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Steele, No. 48-2121 (Miss. 1975) (regulations prohibiting drug price ad-
vertisement held violative of private rights and contrary to public interest); Indiana
Pub. Interest Group v. Cohan, No. 36196 (Indiana Cir. Ct., filed August 27, 1975);
State v. Bd. of Pharmacy, No. 41707 (Hawaii Cir. Ct., September 26, 1974) (consent
judgment allowing reasonable advertising).
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the modified learned profession doctrine than under the more conven-
tional application of the Sherman Act.' Moreover, the ethical rules
against improper solicitation would run afoul of the Sherman Act
strictures on division of markets, which in the normal industrial con-
text are illegal per se. 12 Presumably, the ethical rules against charg-
ing whatever the traffic would bear for legal services, pricing on a
contingent basis for criminal cases or fee-splitting for referrals would
be improper if the Sherman Act were held to apply unmodified to the
legal profession.
Footnote 17 thus opens the way for the courts to consider reasona-
ble justification for professional restrictions. And yet it is clear that,
under the rule of reason cases, the proper justification must be ade-
quate to justify fully the restriction, and the restriction itself cannot
be more extensive than necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose.'63
Meeting such a standard will pose a substantial problem for the
professions.
It had been argued to the Supreme Court that the introduction
of price competition into the legal profession would be destructive,
not only of the profession in its current form, but of quality legal
services. The argument depends upon the economic theory of destruc-
tive competition, which teaches that, when price comparisons are
determinative to most consumers and when those consumers are un-
able to make quality comparisons among products, there exists a
positive disincentive for the investment of time in producing quality
products."4 The cost of shortcuts is lower, thereby providing a more
attractive price to the consumer who cannot tell the difference in
quality. The greater the difficulty of the consumer in judging quality:
the greater the temptation of competitors to cut corners, since
the competitor that skimps does not at once lose all its custom-
ers while the one that scrupulously maintains quality may be
inadequately rewarded for the higher costs of doing so.'
"I See, e.g., United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, Inc., 285 F.2d 688 (7th Cir.
1961).
62 United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Timken-Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
1'3 See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust
Legislation; Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1139,
1151 (1952).
"I The theory is discussed in 2 KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF RFGuLATION 176 (1971).
1,5 Id.
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The Supreme Court dismissed the argument with the remark that
this is the classic basis for seeking exemption from the antitrust laws,
implying that such exemption, if it is to be awarded, must come from
Congress.'66 It is obviously possible that price competition will serve
to lower the prices for legal services, a concomitant of which may be
that the quality of legal services is also in some respects lowered. It
has been suggested, however, that some reduced quality of some legal
services is not entirely bad since lower costs will lead to greater con-
sumption of legal services. And while there may be a number of
clients who have justifiable complaints against lower quality legal
services, there will presumably also be many clients who benefit by
availing themselves even of greatly stripped down legal services. If
the result is, on the whole, cheaper but more widely available legal
services, it may well be worth the price.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Goldfarb acknowledges that
states have a legitimate interest in regulating the ethical standards
of the legal profession. Moreover, the opinion recognizes that the
state may decide that "forms of competition usual in the business
world may be demoralizing to the ethical standards of a profes-
sion."'67 This statement, when taken together with the special treat-
ment suggested for the professions, means in all likelihood that an
adequate state justification for restrictions on professional activity
will be upheld under the rule of reason. But what is required by
Goldfarb is that restrictions not justified in the public interest be
removed, and that any restrictions that are more extensive than
required by a public interest standard be narrowed and focused on
the policy objective sought to be obtained. General references to the
dignity of the profession and its financial well-being will not, in this
formulation, be regarded as sufficiently compelling to justify anti-
competitive behavior. Goldfarb permits a state, after careful consid-
eration of the policy objective sought to be attained in bar regulation,
either to enact statutes or to issue Supreme Court rules that will
immunize required conduct from the antitrust laws. 6 8 Members of
the legal profession, and those charged with regulation and responsi-
bility for the bars in each of the states, should be prompted by the
"1 421 U.S. at 786.
117 Id. at 792, citing United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326,
336 (1952); Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 611-13
(1935).
I" Note that no immunity is available in suits challenging the constitutionality
of regulated conduct, although the state justification will be balanced against the
rights restricted. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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decision in Goldfarb to rethink much of what has been for years taken
for granted.
III.
GORDON AND NASD-ANTITRUST IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
During the past Term, the Supreme Court handed down two deci-
sions that illuminate application of the antitrust laws in a regulated
industry setting.'69 The fact that these two decisions took place in the
securities industry is of special interest, since there more than in any
other regulated industry, the cases have attempted to delineate the
antitrust-regulation boundary.
The principles underlying application of antitrust to the securities
industry were initially articulated by the Supreme Court in Silver v.
New York Stock Exchange.70 There, two broker-dealers, not mem-
bers of the New York Stock Exchange, made arrangements with
members for direct-wire telephone connections, which were essential
for business purposes. The Exchange granted temporary approval,
but subsequently ordered its members to remove the connection. In
a suit charging that the NYSE's conduct violated § § 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act,"' the district court granted summary judgment for the
plantiffs. Although the Exchange had authority to regulate its mem-
bers' dealings in listed securities, in the court's view, any relations
with nonmembers in connection with over-the-counter stock transac-
tions, were not sufficiently germane to the NYSE's statutory duties
of self-regulation to justify according immunity to the clearly anti-
competitive actions challenged by the plaintiffs.'
72
On appeal, the Supreme Court recognized that the challenged
conduct would be a per se violation of the antitrust laws in the ab-
sence of regulation.'73 Thus, the issue before the court in Silver was
whether the Securities Exchange Act M creates a duty of Exchange
self-regulation so pervasive that repeal of the antitrust laws must be
to some extent implied. 75 The problem, the Court recognized, was
one of reconciling the:
,OO United States v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975);
Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
,,0 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
'7' Id. at 345.
' Id. at 346.
,,' Id. at 347.
" 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970), enacted 48 Stat. 881 (1934).
, 373 U.S. at 347.
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pursuit of the antitrust aim of eliminating restraints on compe-
tition with the effective operation of a public policy contem-
plating that securities exchanges will engage in self-regulation
which may well have anticompetitive effects in general and in
specific applications.'
In light of the applicable statutes and rules, '77 the Court found it
impossible to say that self-regulation affecting Exchange nonmem-
bers was "outside the boundaries of the public policy" established by
the 1934 Act.7 8 The proper approach, the Court concluded, would
reconcile the statutory schemes rather than ousting one of them:
Repeal is to be . . . implied only if necessary to make the
Securities Exchange Act work, and even then only to the mini-
mum extent necessary. This is the guiding principle to recon-
ciliation of the two statutory schemes.' 9
The Court then noted that the 1934 Act gives the SEC authority
to request changes in exchange rules and therefore impliedly, to dis-
approve rules, but no jurisdiction to review specific applications of
such rules. Thus, the Court concluded there was no need to consider
whether plaintiffs should have initially invoked the remedial powers
of the SEC.'80
Moreover, the Commissions lack of jurisdiction over particular
applications of exchange rules means that the question of anti-
trust exemption does not involve any problem of conflict or
coextensiveness of coverage with the agency's regulatory pow-
ers. . . . The issue is only that of the extent to which the
character and objectives of the duty of exchange self-
regulation contemplated by the Securities Exchange Act are
incompatible with the maintenance of an antitrust action.'8'
The Court further stated:
There is nothing built into the regulatory scheme which per-
forms the antitrust function of insuring that an exchange will
not in some cases apply its rules so as to do injury to competi-
"' Id. at 349.
" See §§ 6(b), (d) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b) and 78(d)
(1970).
Il 373 U.S. at 357.
179 Id.
lf Id. at 358.
I" Id. at 358 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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tion which cannot be justified as furthering legitimate self-
regulative ends. 8 '
Thus, in Silver, the nonapplicability of the antitrust laws would de-
feat the national policy in favor of competition without furthering the
countervailing policy of the Securities Exchange Act.' The antitrust
laws applied in Silver because they provided the only available mech-
anism for review of the Exchange's actions under its rules.
The Court, however, was careful to note that should other means
of scrutinizing Exchange conduct be available, some sort of antitrust
immunity might exist. Specifically, the Court stated:
Should review of exchange self-regulation be provided through
a vehicle other than the antitrust laws, a different case as to
antitrust exemption would be presented.'
The Court acknowledged that its decision might lead to uncertainty,
but offered some reassurance:
But, under the aegis of the rule of reason, traditional antitrust
concepts are flexible enough to permit the Exchange sufficient
breathing space within which to carry out the mandate of the
Securities Exchange Act.
8 5
Thus, although the statutory scheme governing the Exchange is not
sufficiently pervasive to create a total exemption, some instances of
self-regulation which "fall within the scope and purposes of the
[Act]- may be regarded as justified in answer to the assertion of an
antitrust claim.'
8
As predicted, Silver has produced disparate assessments of the
role of antitrust in the regulated industry context. For example, some
of the Court's language in Silver intimates that the antitrust laws
should be applied differently to regulated businesses. Statements
about the flexibility of "traditional antitrust concepts" under "the
aegis of the rule of reason" may be read as an indication that, instead
of per se rules, a rule of reason analysis should be employed, with the
12 Id.
"K Id. at 360.
IN$ Id.
Ia d.
"' Id. at 361. The Court went on to hold that in denying petitioners the direct-
wire connections without according them notice and hearing, the Exchange exceeded
the scope of its authority to engage in self-regulation under the 1934 Act. Therefore,
its actions were not in that instance immune from attack under the antitrust laws. Id.
at 361-67.
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policies of the regulatory scheme weighed as a relevant factor.
The Seventh Circuit appeared to take this approach in Thill Se-
curities Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange,'7 In Thill, the Court of
Appeals held that an Exchange rule against sharing commissions
with nonmember broker-dealers was not exempt from antitrust at-
tack even though the conduct complained of was subject to SEC
review. The Exchange admitted that its "anti-rebate" rule would be
a per se violation of the antitrust laws in an unregulated context, 8"
but nevertheless claimed immunity on the ground that the rule was
"an integral part of the 'fixing of reasonable rates'" authorized by §
19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.'89 The Seventh Circuit did not
agree that the "mere possibility of SEC review wraps the conduct of
the Exchange in an impregnable shield of antitrust immunity. ' ' ' 0
Instead, the court relied on Silver's declaration that repeal of the
antitrust laws was to be implied only if necessary, and reasoned that
the general power of the SEC to adopt rules touching on an area does
not necessarily place related conduct outside the scope of the anti-
trust laws. "Rather it is at this point that the analysis of reconcilia-
tion really begins."' 9 ' The court indicated that a rule of reason analy-
sis should be applied. Furthermore, the court specifically noted that
SEC review of Exchange rules would not render the antitrust laws
inapplicable.'" However, the Thill court never addressed the question
of how the antitrust laws should be applied. Therefore, its seemingly
broad reading of Silver may be attributable simply to a strict inter-
pretation of what constitutes a "necessity" for implied immunity,
and not to any judicial desire to stimulate flexible application of
antitrust concepts to the regulated industries "under the aegis of the
rule of reason."
Although there may be some dispute as to what view of Silver was
taken by the Seventh Circuit in Thill, other decisions leave little
doubt that the lower courts have in general read Silver narrowly.
Thus, the rule that emerges from some lower court rulings is that
187 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
"I 344 F.2d at 267.
"' Id,
,' Id. at 269.
Id. Thus, the Thill court would oust the antitrust laws entirely only if their
application would frustrate the purpose of the Securities Exchange Act or make it
substantially ineffective. Id. at 270, citing United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S.
171, 189 (1968).
M Id. at 272, citing United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665
(1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); California v.
FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
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where the regulatory scheme is inconsistent with a finding of per se
illegality, justification under the rule of reason is equated with im-
plied immunity from the antitrust laws. For example, in Kaplan v.
Lehman Brothers,'93 the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court
holding19 that Silver barred a per se attack upon the stock exchanges'
practice of fixing minimum rates for commissions. The court noted
that under § 19(b) of the 1934 Act,'95 "Congress enumerated twelve
subjects of the exchange's rulemaking power to which the SEC's
power to alter or supplement would extend. . . .,"I Listed among
these matters is "the fixing of reasonable rates of commission, inter-
est, listing, and other charges."'97
The Seventh Circuit thus found that Congress had given the Ex-
change authority to prescribe reasonable rates of commission and
that those rates, under Silver, were not subject to per se attack. In
addition, the court suggested that the plaintiffs could not challenge
the reasonableness of the rates under the antitrust laws, since rate
making was committed to the Exchange subject to SEC review.'9
Thus, the Kaplan court in effect held that whether the antitrust suit
challenged commission rates as unreasonable or unlawful per se, the
rate structure was impliedly immune from antitrust challenge.
Shortly after Kaplan, another attack on commission rate practice
was struck down in Baum v. Investors Diversified Services, Inc.'9 In
Baum, plaintiffs brought a Robinson-Patman Act claim challenging
a cumulative quantity discount given to some shareholders of mutual
funds. The court recognized that the SEC, through its conduct, had
given approval to the use of quantity discounts. 00
The Act contained no express language permitting the establish-
ment of a quantity discount system, despite the SEC's apparent ap-
proval of the discounts. However, the court viewed the silence of the
Act as immaterial, stating that it was sufficient that:
" 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 954 (1967).
"' 250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
15 U.S.C. § 78s (1970).
"' 250 F. Supp. at 564.
",7 Id. at 565, quoting § 19(b)(9).
"I Plaintiffs had argued that only competitive rates were "reasonable" within the
meaning of that word as used in § 19(b)(9) of the 1934 Act. The Court similarly rejected
this argument stating that it ignored the presence of the word "fixing" in the same
section of the Act.
"1 286 F. Supp. 914 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1969) (on ground
that mutual funds are not "commodities").
"1 286 F. Supp. at 923-24.
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[T]he SEC would be warranted in permitting such a system
as an exercise of its supervisory powers over prices and rates
under Section 22. That the Act is silent on the type of price
and rate structure to be utilized, is a further sign of the perva-
sive regulatory control delegated to the SEC in this area by
Congress.20
Thus, the court found the discount system immune from antitrust
attack merely because a contrary result would have been inconsistent
with unexercised review powers of the SEC.2 12
The Fifth Circuit, in Harwell v. Growth Programs, Inc. ,203 read
Silver in essentually the same way as the courts in Kaplan and
Baum:
Implicit in the judgment of the whole court in Silver, majority,
concurring and dissenting, is the basic concept that the Securi-
ties Act prevails over the antitrust act, when the provisions of
the two are in conflict. . . . Silver then furnishes the guide
which must be followed, i.e., that the repeal of the antitrust
barrier to defendants' actions occurs only if those actions are
necessary to make the statutory scheme for regulation of secur-
ities dealers work, and then only to the minimum extent
necessary.
204
It is evident from these decisions that the Supreme Court's use of
the phrase "rule of reason" in Silver has not been taken literally by
most lower courts. In effect, those courts have not applied the rule of
reason at all, but rather, have found implied exemptions from the
antitrust laws where those laws conflict with the regulatory scheme
in question.
215
"I Id. at 926.
212 The action was also dismissed because mutual funds shares were held not to
be "commodities," and because no facts were alleged to support the finding of a
probable effect on competition. Id. at 918-22.
451 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1971), reh. denied, 459 F.2d 461 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 876 (1972).
451 F.2d at 247.
In some cases it is difficult to determine whether a particular activity chal-
lenged under the antitrust laws is necessary to make the regulatory scheme work. In
such cases, the court may hold that primary jurisdiction exists in the regulatory agency
to determine whether a challenged activity is valid under the regulatory scheme. The
Supreme Court recently decided such a case in Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409
U.S. 289 (1973).
In Ricci, a former commodity exchange member brought an antitrust action
charging that the defendants had conspired to restrain his business by transferring to
another person his Exchange membership without notice or hearing as required by
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Against this background, the Supreme Court heard argument in
Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.2"' In early 1971, Gordon
sued the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock ex-
change on behalf of himself and a class of small investors alleging
violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.117 In particular, the
complaint challenged a variety of Exchange rules and practices and,
Exchange rules and the Commodity Exchange Act. The Court held that the antitrust
proceeding should be stayed until the Commodities Exchange Commission (CEC)
could pass on the validity of the conduct under the Act.
The Court gave three reasons for staying the proceedings. First, the antitrust court
needed to determine whether the Act was incompatible with the maintenance of an
antitrust action. Second, some facets of the dispute were within the statutory jurisdic-
tion of the CEC. Third, adjudication of that dispute by the CEC promised to be of
material aid in resolving the immunity question. The following language is of interest.
If the transfer of Ricci's membership was pursuant to a valid rule, the
immediate question for the antitrust court is whether the rule itself
and Ricci's exclusion under it are insulated from antitrust attack. The
question has substance, for the Commodity Exchange Act, like the
Securities Exchange Act, contemplates that the Exchange and its
members will 'engage in restraints of trade which might be unreasona-
ble absent sanction' by the Act. . . .On the other hand, if. . .loss
of [Ricci's] membership was contrary to Exchange rules, the anti-
trust action should very likely take its normal course, absent more
convincing indications of congressional intent than are present here
that the jurisdictional and remedial powers of the Commission are
exclusive.
Id. at 303-304.
The dissenters in Ricci contended that the SEC had no jurisdiction and that, in
any event, it could not contribute anything useful to the antitrust determination.
A recent case decided since Gordon, Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 520 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir.
1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3335 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1975) (No. 75-660),
declined to find immunity for a NYSE rule governing the pass-through of service
charges, on the grounds that the rule was only peripherally related to the Exchange's
jurisdiction under § 19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, and that the SEC disclaimed
the exercise of any supervisory power. Instead, the court analyzed the restriction under
the rule of reason and found the rule reasonable in light of its purpose and effect. The
Second Circuit construed Silver to mean:
that within the area of supervised self-regulation contemplated by the
Securities Exchange Act, per se concepts are generally displaced and
the courts are to examine whether the particular restraint, even
though it would be a per se violation if performed by others, was
reasonable.
520 F.2d at 1238.
2" 422 U.S. 659 (1975). Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous
Court. Douglas, J., and Stewart, J., joined by Brennan, J., filed separate concurring
opinions.
20? Id. at 660-61. The Complaint also named member firms of the exchanges as
defendants.
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most importantly, alleged that the system of fixed commission rates
utilized by the Exchanges at that time for less than the largest trans-
actions constituted price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act.0"
The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment on the ground that the challenged actions were immune from
attack under the antitrust laws,"0 9 and the Second Circuit affirmed. 10
The Supreme Court granted ceriorari of the question whether the
fixed commission rates were beyond the reach of the antitrust laws,",
and affirmed the result below.
The opinion began with an analysis of the question of reconcilia-
tion of the antitrust laws with the regulatory scheme in the securities
industry, involving a thorough review of the legislative history of the
regulatory provisions applicable to fixed commission rates. The opin-
ion pointed out that commission rates for stock transactions have
been set by agreement since the establishment of the first stock ex-
change. 212 Beginning with the first review of stock exchanges by the
Congress in 1913, the fixed rate policies were noted and apparently
not objected to. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was preceded
by hearings that addressed the subject explicitly, and when finally
enacted, the Act gave the SEC the power to fix and insure "reasona-
ble" rates. 22 The opinion went on to catalogue the substantial
"OS Id. at 661. The Complaint requested injunctive relief and treble damages
amounting to $1.5 billion, together with an award of attorneys fees of $10 million plus
interest and costs.
10 366 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
210 498 F.2d 1303 (2d Cir. 1974).
211 419 U.S. 1018 (1974).
212 422 U.S. at 663. The Buttonwood Tree Agreement of 1972 stated:
We the subscribers, Brokers for the Purchase and Sale of Public Stock,
do herely solemnly promise and pledge ourselves to each other, that
we will not buy or sell from this day for any person whatsoever, any
kind of Public Stock at a less rate than one-quarter percent. Commis-
sion on the Specie value, and that we will give a preference to each
other in our Negotiations.
F. EAMEs, THE NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 14 (1968 ed.).
212 422 U.S. at 664-67. Section 19(b) of the Act provided:
The Commission is further authorized, if after making appropriate
request in writing to a national securities exchange that such exchange
effect on its own behalf specified changes in its rules and practices,
and after appropriate notice and opportunity for hearing, the Com-
mission determines that such exchange has not made the changes so
requested, and that such changes are necessary or appropriate for the
protection of investors or to insure fair dealing in securities traded in
upon such exchange. . . , by rules or regulations or by order to alter
or supplement the rules of such exchange (insofar as necessary or
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attention paid by the SEC to Commission rates since the Act became
law. This attention led to a reevaluation of the fixed commission rate
structure and then finally, in 1975, to the phasing out of fixed com-
mission rates."'
The Court then considered whether the legislative history and the
regulatory history suggested the inapplicability of the antitrust laws.
Articulating the familiar axioms of construction that repeal of the
antitrust laws by implication is not to be favored and that only
where there is a plain repugnance will repeal be implied, '1 5 the Court
began its analysis with the Silver principles. Justice Blackmun con-
cluded that this was the "different case", which the Court did not
decide in Silver, since the SEC had direct regulatory power over
exchange rules and practices with respect to the "fixing of reasonable
rates of commission. ' '2 '1 As a result, it became appropriate to inquire
as to the proper reconciliation between the regulatory and antitrust
statutes. The Supreme Court found the standards for implied repeal
satisfied, inasmuch as to apply the antitrust laws to commission rates
would unduly interfere with the operation of the Securities Exchange
Act.2
17
appropriate to effect such changes) in respect of such matters as.
(9) the fixing or reasonable rates of commission, interest, listing and
other charges.
15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970).
2 New legislation enacted into law June 5, 1975, amends § 19(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act providing, inter alia, that "no national securities exchange may impose
any schedule or fix rates of commissions, allowances, discounts, or other fees to be
charged by its members." Section 6(e), 89 Stat. 107. The SEC may permit exceptions
to this general prohibition after November 1, 1976, if it finds (1) the rates are reasona-
ble in relation to costs of service, and (2) if the rates "do not impose any burden on
competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of this title,
taking into consideration the competitive effects of permitting such schedule or fixed
rates weighed against the competitive effects of other lawful actions which the Com-
mission is authorized to take under this title." § 6(e)(1)(B)(ii).
25 422 U.S. at 682-83. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321
(1963); Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973); Silver v.
New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357-58 (1963).
216 422 U.S. at 685.
S,? Id. at 685-86. The Court decides that the determination of the advisability of
implied repeal is to be decided by the courts in which the antitrust claims are raised.
Where necessary to take advantage of special expertise, courts may defer to the regula-
tory agency involved. Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 306-08 (1973).
The Court disagreed with the suggestion of the United States, which filed a brief
amicus curiae, to the effect that the immunity issue should be decided on a full record.
Justice Blackmun thought summary disposition entirely adequate. The Court re-
garded Ricci as inapposite because in that case deference to the administrative agency
was necessary to determine whether the conduct violated the regulatory rules, whereas
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The Court distinguished Thil2 18 on several grounds. First, there
was no evidence presented in that case regarding the extent of SEC
review of the challenged rule. Second, and more importantly, in that
case the challenged practice was not among those items specifically
listed in § 19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,2t9 and it did not
necessarily apply uniformly. Moreover, Justice Blackmun went on to
say that to the extent that the Seventh Circuit in Thill viewed the
question of implied repeal as a question of fact, "concerning whether
the particular rule itself is necessary to make the Act work," the
Court declined to follow that rule.22
Accordingly, the Court held that to deny antitrust immunity with
respect to commission rates would be to subject the exchanges and
their members to conflicting standards. Thus, the statutory provision
authorizing regulation, the long history of regulatory supervision, and
the continued congressional approval signified by the form of the new
legislation led inevitably to the conclusion that the Securities Ex-
change Act and the antitrust laws are fundamentally in conflict as
applied to fixed commission rates.
Interposition of the antitrust laws, which would bar fixed com-
mission rates as per se violations of theSherman Act, in the
face of positive SEC action, would preclude and prevent the
operation of the Exchange Act as intended by Congress and,
as effectuated through SEC regulatory activity. Implied repeal
of the antitrust laws is, in fact, necessary to make the Ex-
change Act work as it was intended; failure to imply repeal
would render nugatory the legislative provision for regulatory
agency supervision of exchange commission rates. " '
in Gordon there was no factual dispute and the conduct was clearly "encompassed by
the legislation."
2I Thill Securities Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
"Ig The Court concedes that the practice might reasonably be thought to relate to
the fixing of commission rates, which is specifically mentioned in the Act. 422 U.S. at
687.
" Id. The Court distinguishes between the factual question whether fixed com-
mission rates are necessary to the operation of the exchanges under the Act, and the
legal question whether an antitrust suit would conflict with the regulatory scheme. In
the Court's view the factual question was not part of the case and would only become
relevant upon a determination of no antitrust immunity. 422 U.S. at 688.
21 422 U.S. at 691. The concurrence by Justice Douglas emphasized the import-
ance for him of active and aggressive exercise of the power of review and approval by
the SEC. In the absence of that supervisory activity, the mere existence of a statutory
power of review, unexercised, would not be sufficient to immunize the conduct. The
concurrence by Justice Stewart reiterated that the Court was not holding that federal
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The Court last Term also decided United States v. National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.22 another case treating the
relationship between the antitrust laws and securities industry regu-
lation. By a 5-4 vote, the Court held that certain activities engaged
in by broker-dealers were immunized from antitrust applicability by
the existence of regulatory authority.
23
The United States sued the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD), certain mutual funds, mutual fund underwriters
and securities broker-dealers alleging a combination and conspiracy
to restrict the sale and fix the resale prices of mutual fund shares in
secondary market transactions in violation of § 1 of the Sherman
Act.22 The first count of the complaint charged a horizontal combina-
tion among members of NASD to prevent the growth of a secondary
dealer market in the purchase and sale of mutual fund shares. The
remaining counts alleged vertical restrictions on secondary market
activities. 225 The district court held that the statutory scheme com-
prised by the Investment Company Act2 26 and the Maloney Act 22
conferred antitrust immunity for all the practices challenged. 22 Spe-
cifically, the district court concluded that §§ 22(d) and (f) of the
Investment Company Act, together with the Maloney Act, provided
explicit statutory immunity. Moreover, the court decided that the
pervasive regulatory scheme conferred implied antitrust immunity in
the "narrow area of distribution and sale of mutual fund shares."' 9
On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed.
Mr. Justice Powell began his opinion for the majority with a care-
ful review of the revisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940,
which conferred on the SEC regulatory authority over the business
practices of investment companies. 0 Prior to the enactment of the
agency jurisdiction over activities necessarily immunize them from antitrust applica-
bility. Rather "exchange self-regulation is to be regarded as justified in response to
antitrust charges only to the extent necessary to protect the achievement of the aims
of the Securities Exchange Act." 422 U.S. at 692, citing Silver v. New York Stock
Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 361 (1963).
2- 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
23 The majority opinion by Powell, J., was joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart,
Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ. White, J., wrote the dissenting opinion, in which Doug-
las, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., joined.
224 422 U.S. at 700-01.
2 Id. at 701-03.
211 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1, et seq. (1970).
2- 15 U.S.C. § 780-3 (1970).
228 In re Mutual Fund Sales Antitrust Litigation, 374 F. Supp. 95 (D.D.C. 1973).
2 Id. at 114.
21 422 U.S. at 704. Sample provisions of the Act include the requirement for
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Investment Company Act, a number of abuses involving the "two
price system"1 and other aspects of the secondary market in mutual
fund shares were thoroughly exposed by the SEC's Investment Trust
Study,n2 which led to the enactment of the Investment Company Act.
Because the trial court had found the cloak of immunity in the
terms of § § 22(d) and (f) of the Act, the majority opinion then under-
took a detailed review of those provisions. 3 With respect to § 22(d),
Justice Powell, discovering that the lower court had expanded the
price maintenance mandate for sales by "dealers" to transactions in
which a broker-dealer acts as a statutory "broker" rather than a
statutory "dealer," was unable to agree with that reading of the stat-
ute. Moreover, the purpose of § 22(d) was apparently to protect the
primary distribution system, and nothing in the legislative history or
contemporary comment suggests a congressional concern with any-
thing other than the disruptive effects of secondary dealer sales. Ac-
cordingly, the majority viewed reliance on § 22(d) to immunize the
challenged activities from antitrust liability as error.24
Next, the Court examined § 22(f), which the lower court also
found provided a shelter from antitrust liability. Section 22(f) author-
izes the imposition of restrictions on the negotiability and transfera-
bility of mutual fund shares, provided the restrictions conform with
the fund's registration statement and do not violate any rules or
regulations prescribed by the SEC.25
The government argued that the maintenance of contractual re-
submission of detailed financial reports and documentation and the issuance of such
information to shareholders, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29 (1970); limits on the permissible meth-
ods for selecting directors, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16 (1970); registration requirements for all
securities, see Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1970); Investment Company Act,
15 U.S.C. § 80a-24 (1970); standards governing the internal practices of investment
companies, including the requirement of a majority shareholder vote for certain deci-
sions, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13 (1970); and limits to dividend distributions, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
19 (1970).
231 The two price system involved the difference between the net asset value of
mutual funds for the current day, as computed by the fund's portfolio value at the close
of exchange trading the previous day, and the next day's price, based on the net asset
value computed at the close of exchange trading on the present day. Anyone aware of
both prices, as the average investor was not, could hardly fail to reap a profit by trading
in the fund's shares.
21 Part I of the Investment Trust Study is printed as H.R. Doc. No. 707, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). Part II of the study is printed'as H.R. Doc. No. 70, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1939). Part I of the Study is printed as H.R. Doc. No. 279, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1940).
'1 422 U.S. at 711, et seq.
422 U.S.at 720.
Id. at 721, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(f) (1970).
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strictions was not protected by § 22(f) which, in its view, only permits
limitations appearing on the face of the share certificate itself. More-
over, the government argued that the SEC's unexercised power to
prescribe rules and regulations made impossible the creation of the
kind of repugnancy that would serve to immunize the challenged
conduct from the antitrust laws.
236
The majority opinion concluded that the vertical restrictions on
the distribution system challenged by the government were among
the kinds of restrictions Congress contemplated when it enacted §
22(f). The narrower interpretation of the provision would not serve
the functions of the statute to curb abuses connected with the bootleg
distribution system and other practices identified in the Investment
Trust Study.
The Court then addressed the government's contention that the
SEC had been insufficiently active in the exercise of its regulatory
authority to permit an implication of immunity from the antitrust
laws. Justice Powell pointed out that the statute authorizes properly
disclosed restrictions unless they are inconsistent with SEC rules or
regulations. 37 Thus any disclosed restrictions are effective, subject to
SEC disapproval. Given this mechanism, the fact of SEC inaction,
so far from demonstrating inattention, proves that the SEC has ap-
proved all properly disclosed restrictions.2 3
The Commission's acceptance of fund-initiated restrictions for
more than three decades hardly represents abdication of its
regulatory responsibilities. Rather, we think it manifests an
informed administrative judgment that the contractual re-
strictions employed by the funds to protect their shareholders
were appropriate means for combating the problems of the
industry. The SEC's election not to initiate restrictive rules or
regulations is precisely the kind of administrative oversight of
private practices that Congress contemplated when it enacted
§ 22(f).239
The Court thus concluded that the vertical restrictions challenged in
23 422 U.S. at 721.
"I Id. at 727.
As originally introduced, § 22(f) would have authorized SEC promulgation of
rules prohibiting restrictions on the redemption or transfer of mutual fund shares. That
proposal was not accepted, and instead a compromise provision was offered, which
subsequently became law, eliminating the problem and providing for the effectiveness
of fund-imposed restrictions unless disapproved by the SEC.
21 422 U.S. at 728.
ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS
the complaint were among the kinds of agreements permitted under
§ 22(f) of the Investment Company Act.
While the agreements challenged by the United States would or-
dinarily constitute per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 40 here
Congress has decided that these restrictions might be necessary in the
mutual fund industry, and has endowed the SEC with final authority
to determine whether and to what extent such restrictions should be
permitted. That congressional intention requires that the antitrust
laws give way to the regulatory scheme established by the Investment
Company Act, since there can be no reconciliation of the two statu-
tory schemes. The Court concluded, as a result, that the lower court
properly dismissed the counts of the complaint that challenged the
vertical agreements.
24 '
Justice Powell then examined the portion of the complaint that
challenged the horizontal agreement between the NASD and its
members to prevent the growth of a secondary dealer market and a
brokerage market in the purchase and sale of mutual fund shares.
The Court stated at the outset that the activities challenged were
neither required by § 22(d) nor authorized under § 22(f) .242 If they
were to be immunized from antitrust attack, the basis would have to
be the pervasive nature of the SEC's exercise of regulatory authority
under the Investment Company Act and the Maloney Act.
The Court's opinion characterized the SEC's supervisory author-
ity over the NASD as extensive, and calculated to protect the public
interest, which includes concern with the force of effective competi-
tion.24 Justice Powell concluded as a result that the pervasive super-
visory authority lodged in the SEC suggests that Congress intended
to protect association activities approved by the SEC from Sherman
Act application. Thus, the Court held that the challenge of an alleged
conspiracy designed to encourage the supression of secondary market
activity was an attack on a policy the SEC had consistently approved
for nearly 35 years purusant to § 22(f). 44
The Court thus found in this case the necessity of implied repeal
of the antitrust laws in order to make the regulatory scheme work.
In generally similar situations, we have implied immunity in
particular and discrete instances to assure that the federal
240 See, e.g., Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fash-
ion Originator's Guild of American, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
211 422 U.S. at 729-30.
242 Id. at 730.
213 Id. at 732.
240 Id. at 733.
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agency entrusted with regulation in the public interest could
carry out that responsibility free from the disruption of con-
flicting judgments that might be voiced by courts exercising
jurisdiction under the antitrust laws. . . .In this instance,
maintenance of an antitrust action for activities so directly
related to the SEC's responsibilities poses a substantial danger
that appellees would be subjected to duplicative and inconsist-
ent standards. This is hardly a result that Congress would have
mandated.
245
The Court therefore held that the horizontal activities challenged by
the complaint were insulated from antitrust attack because the Sher-
man Act was displaced by the pervasive regulatory scheme found in
the Maloney and Investment Company Acts.
24 6
The four-man minority could not agree that antitrust immunity
ought to follow whenever a regulatory agency has authority to ap-
prove business conduct, whether or not the agency was ordered to
consider antitrust factors and whether or not there is any other evi-
dence of a congressional intention to "displace judicial with adminis-
trative antitrust enforcement. '"247 Mr. Justice White then proceeded
to discuss the law of implied repeal and exemption found in the
recent Supreme Court cases.24 8 Justice White first acknowledged that
express permission or requirement of particular private conduct oth-
erwise violative of the antitrust laws results in inapplicability of those
laws. In addition, Congress sometimes directs an administrative
agency to evaluate practices in the "public interest" and provides
that any approved transactions shall be immune.249 Justice White
recognized that such express exemptions have been given effect by
the courts, but cautioned that even these exemptions are strictly
construed .25
245 Id. at 734-35 (citations omitted).
245 Id. at 735.
24? Id. at 736 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall,
JJ.).
21 See Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., Inc.; 422 U.S. 659 (1975); Federal Mari-
time Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726 (1973); Otter Tail Power Co. v.
United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409
U.S. 363 (1973); Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973); United States
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., Inc.,
373 U.S. 341 (1963); Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296
(1963); California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482 (1962); United States v.
RCA, 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
249 422 U.S. at 736-37, citing, § 414, Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1384
(1970); § 5(11), Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5(11) (1970).
2u 422 U.S. at 737, citing Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc.
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Beyond this, the mere authority of an agency to review conduct
does not immunize that conduct from the antitrust laws. Neither the
existence of the power nor, in Justice White's view, agency approval
of particular transactions of necessity confers antitrust immunity.
The dissent did admit that when Congress has authorized an agency
to evaluate conduct under specifically defined standards that take
into account competitive criteria, then administrative enforcement
displaces judicial enforcement of the antitrust laws.
2 51
The rule of law that should be applied in this case, therefore,
as it comes to us from the precedents, is that, absent an ex-
press antitrust immunization conferred by Congress in a stat-
ute, such an immunity can be implied only if Congress has
clearly supplanted the antitrust laws and their model of com-
petition with a differing competitive regime, defined by parti-
cularized competitive standards and enforced by an adminis-
trative agency, and has thereby purged an otherwise obvious
antitrust violation of its illegality.
25 2
This rule of law, when applied to the facts in NASD, in the view of
the dissenters, failed to produce immunity.
Justice White noted that the Investment Company Act contains
neither an express exemption nor express authority permitting the
allowance of the specific restrictions at issue in this case. In address-
ing the decision of the majority that immunity is conferred by the
SEC's failure to disapprove the practices challenged here, the dissent
took the position that any such conclusion flies in the face of the
familiar rule in favor of strictly construed exemptions and disap-
proval of implied exemptions. That the Court has to "labor" to find
hidden immunities confirmed to Justice White the inappropriateness
of the effort in light of earlier precedents.32
The dissent viewed the conferral of antitrust immunity in this
case as inappropriate, given the fact that there was neither express
immunity, nor direction to consider competitive factors, nor statu-
tory standard to follow with respect to competition, nor any indica-
tion that the SEC had in fact considered the competitive impact of
the restrictions, nor finally any other basis for concluding that Con-
gress intended to supplant the antitrust laws and institute some other
411 U.S. at 726, 733 (1973).
211 422 U.S. at 740-41.
2 Id. at 742-42.
20 Id. at 744.
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form of regulation. 254 The dissent viewed the SEC's activity in
connection with restrictions as wholly inadequate to produce anti-
trust immunity.
Both Gordon and NASD will lead to an expanded concept of
antitrust immunity in the regulated industries. 255 While some might
regard that as unpalatable, if it is more nearly consistent with the
intention of Congress, it is unobjectionable. The fact that in a larger
number of cases antitrust may be deemphasized in favor of regulation
cannot be a disappointment to those who, as judges must be, are
policy neutralists.
Gordon builds directly on Silver. In Silver, immunity was not
found because the SEC had no jurisdiction to evaluate specific appli-
cations of the rule in question, and there was therefore no potential
for monitoring its application in particular cases. On the other hand,
in Gordon, the challenged activity was explicitly anticipated in the
statute, so that the SEC, when it was given authority to order fixed
commission rates, was necessarily entrusted with the power to immu-
nize conduct from antitrust application. Indeed, quite clearly to the
unanimous Court, no other conclusion was possible.
In NASD, the argument was less clear.26 The legislative intention
was not as certain, and the supervisory regulation was not as direct
and did not take the form of affirmative action. Nevertheless, an
assessment of congressional intention leads more logically to the con-
clusion that immunity was intended.
The dissent in NASD strayed on two separate grounds. First, and
least important, its tendency was to view the SEC's lack of action as
the absence of enforcement. Justice Powell's explanation of that lack
of action was somehow not satisfactory to the four dissenting jus-
tices. 57 Some have reasoned that the NASD form of regulatory action
" Id. at 745.
But cf. Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 520 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1975).
I" It is evident that the two concurring opinions in Gordon shed light on the
composition of the majority and the minority opinions in NASD. Justice Stewart in
Gordon emphasized that the mere existence of oversight power would not necessarily
immunize SEC rules from antitrust attack, but that immunity would result to the
extent necessary to promote the aims of regulation of the securities industry. His vote
with the majority in NASD confirms the importance in that case of the majority's
finding of congressional intention to permit NASD-imposed restrictions on mutual
fund distribution systems. Moreover, the Douglas concurrence in Gordon, with its
emphasis on active regulation at the expense of other possibly relevant considerations,
clearly explains his dissent in NASD, where the supervision was of an oversight nature.
'" This is hardly the same kind of "silence" to which the Fourth Circuit alluded
in approving private action that was not objected to by the appropriate regulatory
authority, since in that case the submission was informal and no explicit statutory
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should be accorded less weight since, unlike the SEC mandate of
fixed commission rates in Gordon, no private action that might con-
ceivably violate the antitrust laws is compelled.
While that is an accurate description of the legal dilemmas faced
by the private individuals in each case, it tells very little about the
importance Congress accorded to the procedure or to the role of the
antitrust laws in connection with the regulatory scheme. Far from
assuming that the oversight nature of regulation in NASD demon-
strates a lower priority for the regulatory process, it can be argued
that the restrictions regulated were in fact viewed as relatively more
important, since they were given the force of law, subject only to SEC
disapproval.
The second error of the dissenters reflects a basic philosophic
difference. If it is congressional intention that is to guide the Court
in this area, as properly it ought to be, then the effort ought to be to
fathom that intention, not to set up a variety of presumptions that,
unless surmounted, will produce a certain interpretation, regardless
of what Congress intended. Obviously, explicit legislation involving
immunity is easier to construe than general legislation, permitting
more precise application of the immunity. Yet, to avoid the most
likely interpretation of congressional action only because it does not
meet certain judicially imposed standards of precision is hardly a
service to the meaning of the legislation. Mr. Justice Powell's
painstaking review of the applicable legislation, together with the
state of the industry at the time of its enactment, is persuasive of
congressional intention to confer immunity. NASD quite properly is
viewed as a step back from the anti-regulation aggressiveness of cases
such as Seatrain8 and Otter Tail.1 In both of those cases the Court
labored hard to avoid clear congressional intention and the reader
cannot escape the feeling that antitrust was exalted and Congress'
intention subordinated. 6 0
authority for review existed during the period under scrutiny. Washington Gas Light
Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 252 (4th Cir. 1971).
211 Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726 (1973).
2'1 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
"I United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), while showing
evidence of anti-regulation attitudes, is not a case that should be analyzed in connec-
tion with the immunity question. There Congress through the Bank Merger Act, 12
U.S.C. § 1828(c), and the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841, et seq.,
demonstrated a clear intention to set up a duplicate system for review of the antitrust
consequences of a bank acquisition. While there may be doubt as to the wisdom of such
an effort, there can be little doubt that Congress' intention was clearly understood by
the Court.
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In short, Gordon, a case of "direct repugnancy," and NASD, a
case involving the subtler interrelationship of a general regulatory
scheme and implied repeal of the antitrust laws, were both correctly
decided. Together, they constitute a further step in the movement
toward neutrality in the application of the antitrust laws to the regu-
lated industries.
IV.
CITIZENS AND SOUTHERN-THE RULE OF REASON REAPPEARS
Another aspect of the interface between antitrust and the regu-
lated industries was explored last Term in United States v. Citizens
& Southern National Bank."' In the context of the banking industry,
the Court handed the government its third straight defeat in cases
under § 7 of the Clayton Act 262 and introduced the concept of reasona-
bleness to justify practices challenged under § 1 of the Sherman Act.
Georgia bank law for some years made it impossible for banks to
branch. 6 3 In order to follow its customers to the suburbs and beyond
the Atlanta city limits, C&S created a bank holding company and
established banks in the surrounding counties. Each of these banks
was made a "correspondent associate" bank within the C&S sys-
tem .264
The correspondent associate relationship involved a close associa-
tion between the country banks and C&S. In particular, it was under-
21 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
212 The two previous defeats came in United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418
U.S. 656 (1974), and United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974). For
a discussion of these cases see Shenefield, Annual Survey of Antitrust Develop-
ments-Class Actions, Mergers, and Market Definition: A New Trend Toward
Neutrality, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 299, 329-345 (1975). The dual antitrust scheme
governing the banking industry is discussed in Shenefield, Annual Survey of Antitrust
Developments-The Year of the Regulated Industry, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1, 22-39
(1974).
213 Before 1927, Georgia permitted state-wide branching, but in that year state law
was changed to prohibit all branching. As that strict prohibition led to the establish-
ment of bank holding companies, in 1956, Georgia by statute prohibited a bank holding
company from acquiring more than 15 percent of a bank's stock. Georgia Bank Holding
Company Act, 1 Ga. Laws 1956, pp. 309-12. A further amendment in 1960 reduced the
maximum ownership level to 5 percent. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-207(a)(2) (1967 ed. and
Supp. 1974).
2" 422 U.S. at 92. Six banks were involved, of which five were founded directly
by C&S. The sixth had been an independent bank but was converted into a C&S
correspondent associate bank in 1965. These banks were de facto branch banks in the
Atlanta suburbs. C&S owned 5 percent of the stock of each of the banks and ownership
of much of the remaining stock was held by persons friendly to C&S.
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stood at the outset that, when state law permitted, the banks would
be acquired outright."5 Moreover, the county banks functioned as
C&S subsidiaries and branches and were supplied with the full line
of C&S services. C&S chose the executive officer for each county
bank, the county bank employees were treated according to the same
standards as existed in the C&S system and C&S undertook to super-
vise the county bank activities. '66
C&S supplied data concerning interest rates and service charges
in use by the C&S bank system. Each of the county banks, however,
was cautioned to use its own judgment in setting interest rates and
service charges. It is fair to say that the information was received with
the deference predictable for banks that respected the greater exper-
tise of C&S.
In 1970 Georgia amended its banking laws to permit branching
within any county in which a bank already had an office. ' This
amendment permitted C&S to convert the county banks into de jure
branches.2 1 C&S applied to the FDIC for permission to make an
assets acquisition of the county banks, 29 and after receiving the views
of the Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller of the Currency and
the Justice Department, the FDIC approved the acquisitions of five
of the six banks. 0 The FDIC approved the acquisition of the five
banks because, inasmuch as they did not compete and never had
competed nor was there any reasonable probability that the close
relationship with C&S would be altered, their acquisition by C&S
would not alter the existing competitive structure in any way. 27'
The Department of Justice sued, alleging violation of § 7 of the
Clayton Act and challenging in addition the correspondent associate
255 Id.
2 UId. at 93.
2 Id. at 94, GA. CODE ANN. § 13.203.1(a) (Supp. 1974).
2 422 U.S. at 94. The City of Altanta and its suburbs are located within DeKalb
and Fulton Counties.
2" Id. The FDIC was the appropriate federal agency because C&S chose to acquire
the county banks by having its own bank subsidiaries formally act as the acquiring
banks. The subsidiaries chosen for that role were not members of the Federal Reserve
System. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2)(C) (1970).
270 422 U.S. at 94. The FDIC disapproved the acquisition of the formerly indepen-
dent bank on the ground that the correspondent associate affiliation in that instance
had been "anticompetitive in its origins" and should not be "ratified" by approval of
outright acquisition. The underlying theory for that view was apparently that it would
have been better for competition if C&S had sponsored a new bank in the community
rather than taking control of an independent but sound bank. Id. at 94-95.
-, Id. at 95.
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relationship under § 1 of the Sherman Act.2 2 The government sought
injunctive relief prohibiting the acquisitions and terminating the re-
lationships. Following trial, the trial court entered judgment for the
defendant. 73 The court first held the correspondent associate rela-
tionship insulated from attack under the antitrust laws.24 Further-
more, the court found that the relationships were justified under the
rule of reason and therefore not in violation of § 1 of the Sherman
Act.275 Finally, the court declined to find any anticompetitive effect
as the result of the acquisitions and accordingly found no violation
of § 7 of the Clayton Act.27 1
The Supreme Court affirmed in a 6-3 vote.277 The Court turned
first to the question of immunity. Justice Stewart took the view for
the majority that any antitrust immunities applicable to the situa-
tion had to come directly from the Bank Holding Conpany Act, and
in particular from those provisions dealing with the approval of trans-
actions tending to create or enlarge holding company control of inde-
pendent banks.278 Because the "understanding" was between the staff
of the Federal Reserve Board and C&S, the immunizing provisions
of the Bank Holding Company Act were not applicable, in the major-
ity's view.
279
The majority, however, referring to the "grandfather" provisions
of the Bank Holding Company Act,280 noted that the correspondent
212 Id. at 95-96. The government sued under 12 U.S.C. § § 1828(c)(6) and (7) (1970),
which grant the government the right to challenge, within 30 days, FDIC-approved
acquisitions.
2 372 F. Supp. 616 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
27, Id. at 627. In 1968, the staff of the Federal Reserve Board and C&S entered into
an "understanding" that the correspondent associate relationships did not require
formal approval. The "understanding" resulted from a special investigation by the
Board of the correspondent associate banks to determine whether the degree of control
over the banks requires special "approval" of the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to
§ 3 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1970).
21 372 F. Supp. at 627-38.
278 Id. at 633-38.
r" 422 U.S. 86 (1975). The majority opinion was by Stewart, J., and the dissenting
opinion was by White, J., joined by Douglas and Brennan, JJ.
278 Id. at 102-03; 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq. (1970); 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1970).
211 422 U.S. at 106-08.
2" Id. at 108, citing 12 U.S.C. § 1849(d) (1970):
Any acquisition, merger, or consolidation of any kind described in §
1842(a) of this title which was consummated at any time prior or
subsequent to May 9, 1956, and as to which no litigation was initiated
by the Attorney General prior to July 1, 1966, shall be conclusively
presumed not to have been in violation of any antitrust laws other
than § 2 of Title 15 [§ 2 of the Sherman Act].
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associate relationships with three of the county banks were consum-
mated prior to July, 1966, and that the Attorney General had taken
no action against those transactions by that date. Justice Stewart
concluded that the de facto branch relationship might properly be
characterized as an "acquisition, merger, or consolidation of the kind
described in § 1842(a)," and accordingly held that, at least as to three
of the county banks, the "grandfather" clause provided immunity
from retroactive challenge under the antitrust laws.'
The other three banks, however, were created after July 1, 1966,
and were therefore not eligible for the immunizing treatment of the
"grandfather" provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act. The
majority then undertook to review the relationships between C&S, on
the one hand, and the three younger banks, on the other, under the
provisions of the Sherman Act.211
While admitting that normal branching relationships were benefi-
cial on balance, the government argued that the de facto branching
involved in the C&S system violated the Sherman Act because the
concerned banks were all distinct corporate entities and were obli-
gated as a result to compete with one another.23 C&S conceded that
it did not compete with the county banks but denied that the corre-
spondent associate programs involved even passive agreements to fix
interest rates and service charges. The record did show that C&S sent
information concerning its rates and charges to its correspondent
associates. The Court, however, reiterated that "dissemination of
price information is not itself a per se violation of theSherman Act."' 4
Indeed, the memoranda distributed to the correspondent associates
were stamped "For Information Only," and the county banks were
advised to use their own judgment in setting their own prices. While
the trial court found little difference in the prices among the banks,
it also found as a fact that there was no "collusive price fixing."' 5
Justice Stewart agreed that the kind of behavior involved in this
case, were it to take place among independent competitors, might
ul 422 U.S. at 109.
2 Id. at 111. The one independent bank, whose acquisition was not approved by
the FDIC, established its correspondent associate relationship with C&S prior to July
1, 1966, and therefore came within the coverage of the grandfather provision of the
Bank Holding Company Act. Id. n.21.
2u Id. at 112.
11" Id. at 13, citing United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333,
338 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring); Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States,
268 U.S. 588 (1925); Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
See notes 113-116, supra.
372 F. Supp. at 626.
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involve a conspiracy to affect prices u6 But instead, given the fact
that the Court found the correspondent associate program in general
to be lawful, that conclusion did not follow:
In this unusual light, we cannot hold clearly erroneous the
District Court's finding that the lack of significant price com-
petition did not flow from a tacit agreement but instead was
an indirect, unintentional, and formally discouraged result of
the sharing of expertise and information which was at the heart




The Court then dealt with the government's alternative argument
that the correspondent associate program went far beyond the con-
ventional "correspondent" relationship, and accordingly unreasona-
bly restrained trade under the Sherman Act. While agreeing that the
C&S program did go beyond the normal correspondent relationship,
the Court declined to find a violation. In its view, the crucial point
was that the correspondent associate concept was originated as a
response to the restrictions imposed by the State of Georgia on de jure
branching.2 s
In the context of the restraint of branching imposed by the State
of Georgia, the correspondent associate relationships were designed
to defeat-not to enhance-the state-imposed restraint of trade. The
Court evaluated the purpose and effect of the C&S system and found
them "procompetitive." Thus, in the face of the stringent state re-
strictions on branching, the Court found C&S's program of founding
new de facto branches not unlawful under the Sherman Act. 21
Following from that, the Court was also unable to find defects in
the acquisitions under § 7 of the Clayton Act. Justice Stewart agreed
that the government may have made out a prima facie case of § 7
violation by showing the increase in market shares in various rele-
vant markets, but decided that C&S was able to show that the
422 U.S. at 113-14.
28 Id. at 114.
283 Id. at 115-16. In that context, the question is whether restraints of trade inher-
ent to that unusual function are unreasonable. The Court then recites familiar general
principles of Sherman Act jurisprudence. Even commonly owned firms must compete
against each other if they hold themselves out as distinct entities. Internal expansion
is to be encouraged as a means of finding new customers and higher profits over
agreements among competitors. Business entities cannot justify restraints of trade on
the ground that their sponsorship led to the establishment and flourishing of their co-
conspirators. But the Court does not believe these general principles reach the present
case. Id. at 116-17.
"I Id. at 118-20.
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marketshare statistics gave an inaccurate account of the acquisitions'
probable effects on competition. Because there was neither present
nor past competition-a fact that in this context does not indicate a
violation of the antitrust laws-Justice Stewart found that the pro-
posed acquisitions would not eliminate any present competitive con-
duct or relationships. Nor, in the view of the majority, was there any
prospect that the denial of these acquisitions would lead the various
banks to compete with one another. Accordingly, Justice Stewart
found no unlawful acquisitions under § 7 of the Clayton Act. 9 '
The dissent provided a thorough going counterpoint."' With
respect to the Sherman Act allegations, Justice Brennan failed to
see any effect from the grandfather provision of § 11(d) of the Bank
Holding Company Act. Reviewing the legislative history of that pro-
vision and its language, Justice Brennan failed to see that price fix-
ing, market division or other cartel activities were covered in any
way. In his view, the provision applied only to the classic merger or
acquisition, and C&S did not engage in these transactions prior to
1966. The limited character of the transactions "grandfathered"
argues against the expansion of that language to cover the correspon-
dent associate relationships.
With respect to the merits of the § 1 claim, Justice Brennan first
considered the relationships at their inception. While characterizing
the question as a close one, the dissent was willing to allow for the
possibility of justification. But in his view:
The lawfulness of the practices at their inception, even if as-
sumed, could not be controlling, for changes in market condi-
tions can deprive once-reasonable arrangements of their
justification.
192
The dissent argued that the only relevance of the initial justifica-
tion was in its support of the contention that no bank would engage
in "de facto branching" without a guarantee of perpetual immunity
from the antitrust laws. Justice Brennan did not find that kind of
argument persuasvie, mainly because he was able to conceive of alter-
native tactical responses to an antibranching policy that would be
less restrictive and still serve the C&S interest.
The dissent then examined the C&S affiliations in light of condi-
tions prevailing at the time of suit, when free branching in the At-
,, Id. at 120-22.
" Id. at 130-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas and White, JJ.).
"2 Id. at 143, citing United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545
(E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
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lanta suburbs was clearly permitted by Georgia law. Likening the
C&S system to "common brand" marketing agreements or franchis-
ing arrangements, particularly when undertaken by firms that pos-
sess large market shares,293 he saw difficulty for these kinds of ar-
rangements in the context of the commercial banking industry, since
regulation already inhibits competition and such marketing arrange-
ments restrict the few modes of competition left to the bank. Any
additional impediment to competition thus takes on a larger signifi-
cance and, as a result, Brennan concluded:
These considerations suggest that cooperative arrangements in
commercial banking should be permitted only where their
competitive benefits are clear, and where the combined market
shares of the participants dispel the fear that price collusion
will accompany them. " '
The dissent then failed to find that the C&S system satisfied that
test. Justice Brennan viewed the situation as combining substantial
market shares, agreements not to challenge large rivals, the hege-
mony of a dominant firm and a concentrated market, all of which
impede competition.
The dissent also disagreed that there was no Clayton Act viola-
tion."95 Finding it not improbable that the county banks, denied the
protective association with C&S, would seek their independence, Jus-
tice Brennan found the acquisition leading to a substantial lessening
of competition under future conditions that were clearly discernible.
While admitting that there was some speculation involved in assess-
ing future market conditions, the dissent preferred the uncertainty of
holding open the possibility of future competition rather than ratify-
ing acquisitions in a market that was highly concentrated and where
the acquiring firm was the dominant one.
Citizens and Southern is a case closely tied to its facts, and in the
conventional commercial context, those facts are admittedly unusual
ones. Accordingly, it may be that the precise holdings will be of little
general significance. Within the world of banking, however, a world
cross-hatched with state and federal regulatory restrictions, the case
is more important. It seems to teach that private activities, normally
risking unlawfulness under the antitrust laws, in the context of regu-
lations that are themselves anti-competitive may be justifiable if
23 422 U.S. at 144-45.
294 Id. at 146.
215 Id. at 147-50.
ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS
their purpose and effect is generally procompetitive. This kind of
evaluation is distinct from the normal analysis in which certain con-
duct is absolutely unlawful per se, regardless of the context. Instead,
in Citizens and Southern, conduct that might have been regarded as
per se unlawful is evaluated against the background of the amount
of competition permitted by state law, and in that context found
procompetitive and lawful. The concept of relative procompeti-
tiveness is a fertile one. Indeed, the result may be the introduction
of market incentives into regulated sectors of the economy where they
are sorely needed.
Even beyond the banking world, the reappearance of the rule of
reason after many years in which its demise was often rumored is a
welcome event. 9 ' To those judges with a special interest in the use
of the antitrust laws in a precise and sensitive way, the rule of reason
has always provided the breathing space which the cruder and more
absolute per se doctrine denied. In a world of diverse commercial
arrangements and varying economic circumstances, some formula-
tion enabling courts to take the diversity into account seems neces-
sary and desirable. The concern of some judges with truncated proce-
dures and easy predictability, even at the expense of flexibility, may
now be giving way to a more realistic and more neutral competition
policy.
The opinion also confirms the Court's movement away from the
use of market share statistics as the ultimate indicium of competi-
tiveness in Clayton Act cases. As was the case in United States v.
General Dynamics Corp. ,'9 the Court in Citizens and Southern per-
mits more extended factual proof to show that market share statistics
give an inaccurate picture of the realities of the marketplace. That
concern for and willingness to be guided by economic realities is a
desirable byproduct that could be expected from a less doctrinaire
application of the antitrust laws.
I" Recent cases employing a rule of reason analysis include United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372
U.S. 253 (1963). More recently, the Supreme Court has invoked per se rules in situa-
tions where rule of reason analysis might have reached economically more desirable
results. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Com-
ment, Horizontal Territorial Restraints and the Per Se Rule, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
457 (1971). For a scholarly and often cited discussion of the appropriate roles of the
rule of reason and the per se rules, see Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se
Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division: Part I, 74 YALE L. J. 775 (1965).
2- 415 U.S. 486 (1974). The decision is discussed in Shenefield, Annual Survey of
Antitrust Developments-Class Actions, Mergers, and Market Definition: A New
Trend Toward Neutrality, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 299, 321-29 (1975).
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V.
CONCLUSION
The decisions of this past Term reflect the continuation of the
trend toward neutrality in the application of the antitrust laws. The
appearance of the last antitrust opinion by Justice Douglas is a major
landmark in that process. In every case in which there was a dissent
this past Term, except ITT Continental Baking, Justice Douglas
counted himself among the dissenters. In two of those dissents, Jus-
tice Douglas was the author. His dissenting opinion in American
Building Maintenance, issued on June 24, 1975, was his last antitrust
opinion.
It is not entirely coincidental that his departure from the Court
accompanies the movement away from antitrust activism. His views
on the virtues of competition as a fundamental ingredient of Ameri-
can life were sufficiently enthusiastic that his colleagues on the Court
were much influenced for some 35 years. Not even the student of
antitrust, who was at times frustrated by the sweeping opinions that
seemed to decide so much more than the particular case, or who
looked in vain for support in the record for positions taken in those
opinions, could fail to be moved by Justice Douglas' reverence for the
small, family-owned business or his repugnance for the mechaniza-
tion and industrialization of every sector of American life. For him,
"big" business was an epithet, and economies of scale were never a
sufficient justification.
This apostle of competition contributed much in the decision-
making, even as the Court now moves to a more moderate position
in the antitrust spectrum. Whatever one may think of the results of
the decisions in the Term to come, one cannot doubt that the fire and
spirit and vigor of Justice Douglas will be missed.
